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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Gold in Ghana 
Small-scale mining has been perceived as an important pillar for poverty reduction in 
developing countries and as a major contributor to national income for countries with 
minerals reserves and mining practices taking place (Hentschel, Hruschka, & Priester, 2002). 
This includes Ghana, with gold accounting for 37% of the Ghanaian national exports (G. 
Hilson, 2002a). For decades, however, small-scale mining has been ‘below the radar’ of the 
Ghanaian government. This has inhibited both the provision of governmental support to 
improving the lives of the poor, boost the sector’s poverty reduction potential, and the ability 
to profit from increased revenues for the government. This started to change in the late 1980s 
when – as a way of formalizing the sector - small-scale mining became legal for miners with a 
license. The focal point of this research is the process of formalization of small-scale mining 
sites in Ghana and its corresponding benefits from the miners’ perspective.  
 Scholars, donors and governments have been putting emphasis on the need to 
formalize the small-scale mining sector. Interestingly, there is no consensus in the body of 
literature over the effects of formalization policy for the intended subjects. As such, Siegel 
states that “it is not always clear […] what it is about formalization that holds the key to 
economic development or pollution abatement” (2009, p. 52). Therefore, instead of instantly 
and urgently calling for formalization, this research will view the formalization process from 
the miners’ perspective. Besides providing insights into the benefits and disadvantages of 
formalization of small-scale mining, this thesis will put forward various and discrepant 
notions of (il)legality as produced by both miners and government. 
Ghana is rich with gold and for over 1000 years Ghana has been a major supplier of 
gold (G. Hilson, 2002a). In the year 900 Ibn al-Faqih, a Persian historian and geographer, as 
quoted in G. Hilson, stated "in the country of Ghana gold grows in the sand as carrots do" 
(2002a, p. 13). The omnipresence of gold in (certain parts of) Ghana is hereby clearly 
exemplified. From the 15
th
 century onwards, various European colonial rulers ruled Ghana, 
with Britain gaining control of Ghana in 1874, thereby establishing the Gold Coast (Dummett, 
1998). Shortly, many gold mining companies were formed - by merchants and investors from 
Britain - which resulted in two gold rushes in the beginning of the 1900s, leading to a great 
increase in gold production (G. Hilson, 2002a). In 1957 Ghana became independent, after 
which the government of Ghana aimed to strictly control the mining sector, as amongst others 
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it realized the profitability of the mining sector. The strict rules and regulations that were 
implemented caused a period of stagnated production.  
In the 1980s, the export sector, and in particular the mining sector, was seen as an 
important sector to help the revival of the economy (Bansah, Yalley, & Dumakor-Dupey, 
2016). Therefore, the Ghanaian government established the Small-scale Gold Mining Law in 
1989. The implementation of these policies has ended the economic stagnation process and 
since, the gold mining industry has grown rapidly (G. Hilson, 2002a). The formalization of 
small-scale mining by the government has enabled Ghanaians above the age of 18 to obtain a 
license to commence small-scale mining. Besides the economic benefits, the formalization of 
small-scale mining was meant as a policy approach “to revive the SSM [small-scale mining] 
sub-sector, facilitate supervision and minimize associated environmental hazards” (Bansah et 
al., 2016, p. 9). The Small-scale Gold Mining Law led to the establishment of many legal 
small-scale mining operations. However, a great deal of illegal small-scale mining operations 
still exist, with G. Hilson and Potter stating that "it is estimated that as many as 85 percent of 
the country’s artisanal and small-scale gold mining operators are, in fact, galamsey1" (2003, p. 
250).  
 
1.2 The study’s focus, aim and relevance 
The focus of this research is on small-scale mining in Ghana, defined by Bansah et al. as 
"mining of gold by any effective and efficient method that does not involve substantial 
expenditure by an individual or group of persons not exceeding nine in number or by a co-
operative society made up of 10 or more persons" (2016, p. 8). The small-scale gold mining 
sector, experiencing growth for the last 20 years in less-economically developed countries, is 
“a significant contributor to the economic development of these countries” (Baretto, 2011, p. 
6). However, high levels of illegality characterize the sector, with groups of miners 
conducting generally unsafe work in an uncontrolled environment. As such, the gold mining 
sector, besides being a great source of employment and possible creator of wealth for certain 
governments and groups of people, is interlaced with - amongst others - social and 
environmental challenges. It therefore attracts attention from beyond national borders, by 
groups such as environmental organizations and social development strategists and – amongst 
others international development, social sciences and environmental sciences – scholars.  
                                                          
1
 Term refers to small-scale miners working on illegal small-scale mining sites, which will be elaborated later on. 
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Scholars, donors and governments have emphasized the need to formalize the small-
scale mining sector. By formalizing the sector it is assumed that governments are better able 
to govern the sector and to manage the sector’s impact when it comes to social and 
environmental impacts, thereby minimizing negative effects and expanding positive impacts 
of small-scale mining (Salo et al., 2016). However, in the literature the insights into the way 
in which formalization is perceived by the intended subjects are minimal. This creates 
questions regarding the general need stated in the literature to increasingly formalize the 
small-scale mining sector as there is no insight into the way in which this policy plays out in 
practice. 
In Ghana, the government established the Small-scale Gold Mining Law in 1989. 
Thereby, the Ghanaian government produced the distinction in the lawful sense between legal 
and illegal operations, as it states that small-scale mining operations need to be in possession 
of a license to obtain minerals from the ground. As such, prospective owners of a small-scale 
mining site can apply for a license. When the license has been obtained, the mining site is thus 
registered by the government. In this research, differences will be put forward on the basis of 
the legal or illegal status of the mining site. However, as various definitions of (il)legality will 
be elaborated on, it is of importance to avoid ambiguity on descriptions of legal and illegal 
sites. Therefore, legal sites - in the lawful sense - will be referred to as registered sites, 
whereas illegal sites - in the lawful sense - will be referred to as unregistered sites. After a 
license is obtained - i.e. after the mining site has been registered -, the mining activities 
undertaken on the site are considered legal activities.  
However, there is still a high prevalence of illegal small-scale mining in Ghana. 
Considering the seemingly good arguments for formalization (e.g. reducing health risks, 
securing incomes for the poor and diminishing environmental damage) and the fact that 
formalization is a process that is welcomed by many scholars and policy makers, questions 
arise such as: what are reasons for small-scale miners to work on unregistered sites? What 
concrete benefits are in place for workers at registered small-scale mining sites?  
The main benefits of small-scale mining that are brought forward by G. Hilson (2001) 
in his contextual review of the small-scale mining sector in Ghana, are employment and 
revenue. Especially because of the labour-intensive nature of small-scale mining - due to the 
lack of technological equipment and therefore the need for manpower - small-scale mining 
“has a major impact on the employment situation in the developing world” (G. Hilson, 2001, 
p. 5). By linking these insights to the emphasized need for formalization, questions arise such 
as: what are the differences between working conditions on registered and unregistered sites? 
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Is there any evidence that formalization indeed expands the positive social impacts of the 
small-scale mining sector? And does this mean registered mining operations ensure better and 
more sustainable access to employment?  
In this research, a clear division will be made between registered and unregistered sites, 
however from the literature it is clear that legality or illegality is not the only perspective of 
looking at the sector or its operations. Therefore, a distinction between legal, formal and licit 
will be made in this research. By instead of focusing on the division between legal or illegal 
practices, regarding mining practices as part of the informal economy creates a way in which 
rules are not (exclusively) made by the state (Elyachar, 2002). Also, some unregistered 
practices can be considered legitimate by the actors involved, which is called licit (Abraham 
& van Schendel, 2005). Acknowledging the opportunity of viewing the small-scale mining 
sector from different perspectives other than the strict division between legal and illegal – i.e. 
registered or unregistered -, opens up the possibility of  acknowledging how different actors in 
the mining sector regard operations in different ways. In this research a light will be shed on 
the different perspectives of (il)legality, by focusing on the main actors of the small-scale 
mining sector, which are the miners themselves, but also national and local governmental 
actors.  
Therefore, the main research question that will be explored in this thesis is: How is 
(il)legality of small-scale mining sites regarded by both governmental actors and miners and 
what is the impact of the legal status of a small-scale mining site on the work of miners? 
 
1.2.1 Social and academic relevance 
The social relevance of this research lies in the fact that its focus is the daily practice and 
views of miners, thereby providing insights into the intended subjects of formalization policy 
- as such providing ‘a grassroots perspective’. Many scholars point to the need for increased 
formalization, a process which is predicted to go hand in hand with a better ability to manage 
the sector’s consequences, amongst others regarding social benefits. The high prevalence of 
unregistered small-scale mining in Ghana means that the process of formalizing the informal 
sector is hampered by certain factors. The question why unregistered small-scale mining is 
still so ubiquitous has not been properly answered. To answer this question it is of great 
importance to give a voice to a group that needs to be heard when it comes to the policy of 
formalization: both miners working on registered and unregistered mining sites. By spending 
time with these people in order to find out what they regard as the benefits of working on 
either a registered or an unregistered site, insights will be given into why they do the work 
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they do, how they regard legality and illegality, how it affects their daily lives and what 
improvements they wish for. Therefore, this research can have great implications on the 
practice of policy and daily life of the miners, and it will be of importance to ventilate the 
findings of this research.  
As such, this research is part of a partnership with Witteveen + Bos. Witteveen + Bos 
is an internationally operating, Netherlands-based engineering company mostly focused on 
water projects. They are planning on setting up a project in Tarkwa revolving around mining 
and water. This project can profit from my research, by gaining a better understanding of the 
relationship between first of all registered and unregistered small-scale mining operations, and 
secondly between the government and small-scale mining operations. This qualitative, in-
depth study can additionally set the scene of Tarkwa, the town in which this research is 
conducted. This enables Witteveen + Bos to set up water and mining projects in Tarkwa from 
which both miners and the local community can benefit. 
As this research is focused on the miners’ perspective on the impacts of governmental 
policies, the academic relevance of this research is the contribution it makes to knowledge of 
how definitions are produced and contested by various involved actors, instead of having 
fixed intrinsic meanings. Legality is something that is imposed top-down, with governmental 
actors establishing the division line between legal and illegal. This however does not mean 
that it is effected in the same way by society. This research adds to knowledge on the process 
that occurs in society of whether or not the law is naturalized and on what basis. This 
knowledge on the construction of the concept of (il)legality, leading to general insights into 
the construction of a definition such as (il)legality, is also useful in other policy sectors, in 
which different concepts of (il)legality might play a similar important role. 
 
The following paragraph will serve the purpose of getting a sense of the town where this 
research has taken place, thereby addressing the way in which the town has evolved and the 
type of mining activities that take place in Tarkwa. Chapter one will be concluded by 
reflecting on the chosen methodology. The second chapter provides insights into the 
theoretical notions which will be used to analyze the ethnographic data, thereby elaborating 
on notions of governance, distinguishing between legality, formality and licitness, and finally 
the concept of access. The third chapter will address first of all the scholarly consensus in 
favor of formalizing the small-scale mining sector, which will be contrasted with the practice 
of how miners regard (il)legality. Thereby, the way in which miners construct and utilize 
discrepant definitions of (il)legality is stressed. The fourth chapter sheds light on the role of 
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the Ghanaian government in the formalization process, by first of all elaborating on the small-
scale mining law. Subsequently, the effectiveness of the government in general and the role 
the government plays when it comes to formalization policy will be elaborated on, by 
discussing the view of miners on the government and by discussing the actions of three main 
governmental actors on the local level. Following, chapter five provides the existing 
differences and similarities between registered and unregistered small-scale mining practices, 
thereby illustrating what effect formalization policy has on the practice of miners. Finally, the 
sixth chapter provides the discussion and the main conclusions that can be drawn from the 
research. 
 
1.3 Setting the scene: the mining town of Tarkwa 
The vast body of literature on small-scale mining in Ghana has a clear focus on rural activities, 
leading to an underdevelopment of knowledge on urban mining settings. The town that served 
as the stage of this research is the urban mining town of Tarkwa, situated in the Western 
Region of Ghana. To regard the field of study - being Tarkwa - as a neutral space which has 
evolved on its own is unrealistic and does not do justice to the interconnectedness of places, 
as showed by Gupta and Ferguson (2007). In their article on how culture and the making of 
identity can relate to spaces, Gupta & Ferguson provide valuable insights into the way in 
which space itself is often considered “a neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical 
memory, and societal organization are inscribed” (2007, p. 7). However, they warn for this 
“assumed isomorphism of space, place and culture” (Gupta & Ferguson, 2007, p. 7) that sees 
space as an organizing principle. Therefore, I will hereby shortly go into the history of Ghana 
and the way in which the town of Tarkwa has evolved, besides elaborating on the mining 
activities that take place in town. 
 
Interconnectedness of places: Ghana and Tarkwa evolving 
Ghana is now an independent country with a history of colonial rule, celebrating its 60
th
 year 
of independence during my stay in Ghana. Without a territorial change in space after 
independence, people however “find the nature of their relation to place ineluctably changed” 
(Gupta & Ferguson, 2007, p. 10). The impact of colonial rule is, amongst others, clearly 
visible in the large number of underground shafts dating from colonization, which are now 
used by small-scale miners to obtain ore from. It is interesting to note that Ghana is classified 
by the World Bank as a lower middle-income country from 2011 onwards (Quandzie, 2011). 
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Lower middle-income countries are countries with a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) 
between $1036 and $4085 in 2012. In 2011 Ghana was even prospected by the World Bank’s 
projections as “the fastest growing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa” (The World Bank, 2011). 
However, Ghana remains on the low side of the spectrum of the lower middle-income 
countries, with an average per capita income of $1820 (Nketiah-Amponsah, 2015). 
Additionally, Dr. Nketiah-Amponsah from the University of Ghana weakens the current 
position of Ghana as he states that “the country has only but transited by a small margin from 
a low-income to a middle-income economy status” (2015). He additionally states that a lot of 
development indicators still belong to the level of a low-income country, with a lot of 
challenges persisting in the country revolving around corruption, human capital development 
and infrastructure (Nketiah-Amponsah, 2015). 
 Shifting focus from the nation of Ghana to the mining town of Tarkwa, Tarkwa is 
mostly seen as a mining town with a large influx of workers prospecting a job in the gold 
mining sector. First of all, it is considered to be the oldest mining settlement in Ghana, with 
the establishment of the settlement due to gold mining in the 1880s (Gough & Yankson, 
2012). The population of Tarkwa is growing fast, mostly due to the influx of people from 
other districts into the town who are in search of a job in the mining sector. Akabzaa and 
Darimani (2001) state that Tarkwa has an unusual population structure. The part of the 
population that is of working age (15-64 years) consists of 70%, with children up to 10 years 
old constituting 24,8%. However, the national average of children up to 10 years old consists 
of 45%. Akabzaa and Darimani (2001) attribute this to high labor migration rates in Tarkwa. 
In 2000, 52% of the Ghanaian population of Tarkwa was born in the locality (Gough & 
Yankson, 2012). Interestingly, during the research, when asking where miners came from, 
they related this to the place where their family was from. Even miners that were born in 
Tarkwa, but whose family originally came from another region, would state they were from 
the other region outside of Tarkwa too, indicating a strong territorial adhesion or attachment. 
Besides a large amount of migrant workers from within Ghana, there is a significant influx of 
Chinese migrants, coming to Ghana to invest in and equip technology for the mining sector.  
Tarkwa’s popularity when it comes to gold mining is attributed to the fact that Tarkwa 
is rich with gold as it is located on a “gold bearing reef”, as expressed by one of my 
informants, a professor from the University of Mines and Technology in Tarkwa. As such, the 
whole of Tarkwa is scattered with underground mining shafts. The large network of 
underground shafts beneath the entire city are often connected to each other. The occurrence 
of mining activities in town is exemplified by a story of a member of Boboobo, the 
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community that I was living in. She explained to me how the whole city was full of 
underground tunnels, which she exemplified by the story of the time she was making fufu, a 
local Ghanaian dish which needs to be prepared by repeatedly pounding on the dough-like 
substance. While pounding fufu, she was approached by miners telling her to stop her 
activities as people were working underground. The miners stated that the noise was very loud 
for them and they expressed a fear that if she would continue to pound the fufu it might cause 
the ground to collapse. At another occasion, the same community member felt the earth 
shaking beneath her, as people blasted stone just under her house. She pointed out the cracks 
in the walls of her house and the surrounding houses, according to her all caused by the 
blasting of rock by small-scale miners. These stories exemplify how small-scale mining is 
omnipresent throughout the town. 
Gough and Yankson regard the rise in population as a result of miners searching for 
mining jobs and even talk of “severe overcrowding” in Tarkwa (2012, p. 664). Gough and 
Yankson (2012) also notice that it is not only the mining sector that has grown, but say the 
mining sector stimulated a rise in commerce and service sectors in the town, with “the 
economy of the town being closely linked to the fortunes of the mining industry” (Gough & 
Yankson, 2012, p. 664). As Gough and Yankson (2012) explain it, whenever the mining 
sector is experiencing hardship or misfortune, the whole town is suffering. However, with 
good gold prices in the last years, “the mining sector is thriving and Tarkwa is booming” 
(Gough & Yankson, 2012, p. 664). This consequently led to an expansion of the town, 
however without proper urban planning of infrastructure. During my fieldwork period, some 
of my informants showed me pictures of rural and forested areas in Tarkwa from a few years 
ago, after which they expressed where these pictures were taken. Only then it became clear to 
me that these pictures were taken at places that were now certainly part of the town, instead of 
being on the outskirts or even outside of town. This is illustrative of the rapid growth this 
town has been subject to in the last few years.  
 
Mining in Tarkwa 
To get a better sense of the town and especially the mining activities, I will hereby shortly 
elaborate on the three types of mining methods that are prevalent and which I have 
encountered during my stay in Tarkwa. The three categories of mining activities are 
underground shaft mining, open pit mining and alluvial mining. Underground shaft mining, 
which was introduced during the British colonial rule, entails workers going down a shaft to 
obtain the ore which contains the gold. This type of mining is characterized as labor intensive, 
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low skilled with generally low levels of technical equipment (Tsuma, 2010). Most of the 
small-scale miners I have worked with during my fieldwork conducted underground mining, 
either working in reopened old colonial shafts that are scattered throughout the town or 
digging shafts themselves. In underground mining operations the surface of the land is not 
wasted as opposed to open pit mining, where the land is being blasted or excavated to obtain 
the gold from layers of the ground (Tsuma, 2010). Therefore open pit mining, or surface 
mining, is often considered “wasteful of land resources” (Tsuma, 2010, p. 66). Open pit 
mining is generally considered capital intensive, as it requires a lot of technological 
equipment, and is the main type of mining for large-scale mining operations. Open pit mining 
also occurred in Tarkwa, mainly in the two large-scale mines located in town, being 
Goldfields and AngloGold Ashanti. Of these two especially Goldfields is very prominent as it 
is in the middle of the town and can easily be spotted from several places in town. However, I 
have also encountered some small-scale open pit mining operations, which then requires the 
workers on site to hire an excavator at some points in time to take off some layers of land to 
reach the levels in the ground which contains the gold bearing rock. Thirdly, alluvial mining 
is practiced on river banks as it revolves around the process of obtaining gold particles from 
water bodies, causing serious problems regarding water quality. I have encountered alluvial 
mining two times in Tarkwa. However I could not get close to these people, as water was a 
physical boundary that I could not cross at that time. 
Besides the different types of mining activities, the heterogeneity of small-scale 
mining sites is striking. This means that I have seen great differences between underground 
mining operations - as they are most prevalent in Tarkwa - with amongst others great 
differences in scale, available technologies and types of organization of the small-scale 
mining sites. As such, the categorization of the small-scale mining sector as being labor 
intensive with low levels of access to mechanization, technology and capital investment does 
not do justice to the diversity and heterogeneity of small-scale mining operations in Tarkwa. 
By acknowledging these differences in small-scale mining practices, it is of importance to say 
that these are not the differences that will be focused on in this research. The differences that 
will be focused on are those that occur or that are reported to have occurred as a result of the 
legal status of the small-scale mining site, or happen to be prevalent on the different mining 
sites that have been visited while enacting this research. 
Lastly, my research in Tarkwa can be related to a general view of small-scale mining 
in an urban area, especially one that is highly influenced by the colonial past, with the 
presence of underground mining shafts scattered throughout the city. The characteristics that I 
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found to apply to small-scale miners in Tarkwa can therefore be found outside of Tarkwa in 
other urban mining settings in and possibly beyond Ghana. As such, one commonality I 
noticed with all miners was that they were not too positive about the mining activities they 
were undertaking daily, as it is physical, dirty and generally dangerous work. As such, they all 
expressed they did the work because they need the money to provide for their family. Small-
scale mining is often described as poverty driven, which is partly true, but a nuanced view 
must be given here. Great differences exist between the income and living standard of miners, 
but generally speaking miners were able to pay for food and decent accommodation, with 
many trying to live off as little money as possible enabling them to save up money which they 
can use for paying for expenses of their family and sometimes by sending it to their family in 
other parts of Ghana. As such, a lot of miners admitted that they chose this job over another, 
which would provide them with money however not with as much as they were making now. 
 
1.4 Conducting fieldwork: a word on methodology 
After elaborating on the town where I conducted the research, here I will go into the 
methodology of the conducted research, specifying amongst others the entry into the field and 
the type of informants and reflecting on the chosen methodology.  
 
Gaining access to informants 
Upon coming to Ghana I was mostly concerned with getting access to informants, as I 
realized that this was a crucial element of conducting the research. However, soon after 
arriving in Tarkwa for the first time, I realized that access would not prove to be a major issue, 
especially due to two factors. First of all, upon arrival in Tarkwa, I was accompanied by a 
professor from the University of Leiden and two other students, one of which would also be 
conducting research in Tarkwa. The professor had been in Tarkwa once before and during the 
two days we spent together in Tarkwa, we were introduced to some miners who, as it turned 
out, proved to become key informants. A second beneficial factor is the factor of space, 
namely the decision to be conducting this research in Tarkwa, a mining town that is scattered 
with mostly underground shafts and washing sites – where the ore is respectively taken from 
the subsoil and where the ore is crushed and washed to obtain the gold particles. I soon 
noticed that there were so many places to conduct the research, which made me feel more 
secure regarding ensuring access to miners. This realization however did not make the first 
steps into the research easy. Besides the fact that conducting anthropological research was 
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totally new for me, it was also the first time on a mining site and this first visit overwhelmed 
me – amongst others due to the high prevalence of men on the sites - as there are generally no 
women on the site except for some who mostly sell food. 
However, I had been looking forward to this process of conducting research for such a 
long time that I could fairly easily put aside the overwhelming and intimidating feelings I felt. 
I started close to my home in Tarkwa, as there were several washing sites located just 2 
minutes walking distance from the home I lived in. When entering different sites, I quickly 
noticed whether I felt comfortable there and whether there were people there who were 
willing to talk to me and interact with me. Freilich, as quoted in Robben and Sluka has stated 
that “success in fieldwork is more a function of personal ability than of previous training in 
specific techniques” (2012, p. 1). In this case I feel my general enthusiastic behaviour towards 
new things and people sparked people to be open to me too and thereby being able to help me 
with the research.  
One of the reasons of feeling overwhelmed during my first visit to a mining site in 
Tarkwa did not occur to me until later. I figured first that it was solely my own discomfort 
with the new situation and with the prevalence of men on the site. As it turned out that day, 
and what I would encounter many times after, the men we were talking to were not speaking 
directly to me, but to the two male students that joined us. Additionally, I was struggling a lot 
with understanding the for-me-unfamiliar English accent the Ghanaians had. Then, the fact 
that they were directly speaking to the male students instead of talking in my direction, 
complicated my first encounter with a mining site. During the rest of the fieldwork, I was 
living together with Pablo, the other student who was also in Tarkwa to conduct research, and 
about half of the time we went to a mining site together and the other half we went separately. 
Therefore, I very well noticed the difference between going to a mining site with him or 
without him. Sometimes when I would visit a mining site with him, the miners were almost 
only responding to him and directed towards him, even though it was me who was asking the 
question they were answering. In these cases I did not feel it was successful to try extra hard 
to get included into the situation, so in these situations I decided to keep a low profile and 
mostly observe and listen. However this did not happen too often and I feel that the people we 
spent more time with and who ended up being good informants did treat us more like equals 
when it comes to gender, as they saw we were both conducting serious research and both 
Pablo and me were equal in that sense. Additionally, living together with Pablo during the 
research enabled me to reflect on this gender issue, besides other both methodological as well 
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as content-wise struggles. As such, the living situation proved beneficial to me as it enabled 
me to share my experiences, possible doubts and insights at that time. 
 
Establishing a relationship with informants 
Cultural anthropologists' information is often based on participant observation “which hinges 
on the dynamic and contradictory synthesis of subjective insider and objective outsider” 
(Robben & Sluka, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, it is important for an anthropologist to become an 
'insider'. Besides the fact that I am a woman, an important factor that I have discussed above, I 
am white with a completely different background as I grew up and lived most of my life in the 
Netherlands. This made it quite impossible to become an insider. However, during my 
research I felt it was generally a benefit, as people were happy to help me and were eager to 
explain about the work they do. To get a good relationship with the informants, I felt it was 
most important to just take time to be there and especially show how invested I was. It helped 
to learn a bit of the local language, tell the miners that I am eating the local foods, which 
generally led to great laughter as they probably did not expect an obroni (local word for 
foreigner) to eat their food, and to help a bit wherever I could or follow them into the 
underground shafts. Also telling people where I was living sparked reactions which - I believe 
- changed their views about me in a positive way. This is so because the particular community 
I was living in, called Boboobo, was considered quite underdeveloped as for instance there 
was no running water and the community relied on community boreholes and wells. One 
informant, when hearing where I was living, even became angry and asked me who took me 
there and how he could have done that, as he did not consider this place good enough for me, 
as an obroni. However, I explained him - as well as most other informants - that I was happy 
staying at this community as this allowed me getting a chance to get close to this community 
and its inhabitants.  
As easy as getting access was, establishing a good relationship with my informants 
proved to be quite difficult. Firstly, I tried to draw on tips of Berreman (2012) who states that 
especially during the start of the fieldwork, generally more useful knowledge comes from 
observing, as people wish to give a favourable impression and in conversations and interviews 
therefore would state the favourable answers. However, during the first few visits to the 
mining sites, miners were generally happy to show me the process they were doing, thereby 
often showing the gold they obtained. Therefore, I was mostly interacting with them and felt I 
was making good connections. Then, however, after coming back a few times and also 
wanting to do some observations without asking questions, some miners seemed puzzled 
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about why I was not asking questions anymore and why I was, basically, just hanging around 
at their sites. It happened a few times that some informants that were very open during the 
first (few) meetings, then at another time were all of the sudden not there anymore, even 
though I had arranged to meet up, or were very much closed off. Fortunately, there were quite 
some informants that I really got a good connection to, as such enabling me to join them 
during their daily work or occasionally meet up after work.  
 
Reflecting on the type of informants 
Reflecting on the difficulty I had with establishing a good relationship with some miners, goes 
hand in hand with reflections on the types of informants I had during my research. Gupta & 
Ferguson additionally acknowledge how “cultural difference is produced and maintained in a 
field of power relations in a world always already spatially interconnected” (2007, p. 17) and 
urge us to explore how these cultural differences came into being and continue to be 
reproduced. Therefore, to do justice to the interconnectedness of the town and its various 
inhabitants, it is of importance to shed light on the background of the informants in this 
research and the existing power relations within the small-scale mining sector of Tarkwa. Of 
the 3 months that I spent in Ghana, I spent 2,5 months in Tarkwa, conducting fieldwork. 
During this time, I have conducted research with various actors, with a clear focal point on 
miners coming either from Tarkwa or from elsewhere in Ghana. The group of mining 
informants consists of solely male miners from both registered and unregistered sites, doing 
all kinds of jobs, ranging from owning a mining or washing site, to going down into shafts to 
obtain the gold bearing rock. Generally, a lot of miners spoke really well English, which 
therefore did not pose a great problem whilst conducting research. I talked to numerous 
miners, but here I will mention solely the persons that I had substantial conversations with, 
which led to interesting insights for the research. As such, I talked to 24 miners, of whom 13 I 
saw at least on 4 different occasions. I met these miners on 6 mining sites and 4 washing sites. 
More formal interviews, in which I had clear questions written down which were asked one 
after the other, were conducted with two government officials, a chief and a university 
professor of the University of Mines and Technology in Tarkwa, all of whom I visited either 2 
or 3 times. 
 Initially, I was putting a lot of emphasis on the need to spend time with both “lower” 
and “higher” ranking miners - as I put it during the phase of preparation for the research -
meaning site owners and overseers versus people who do the physical labour. This was the 
case because I expected a lot of different knowledge and especially different standpoints 
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amongst different ranks on the mining sites. As it turns out, it was easier to visit a mining site 
and talk to the overseers, who mostly had time to spare. It was more difficult to make 
appointments and spend time with the miners who do the actual work, which includes going 
down into the shafts for days. This makes sense, as miners who do the physical work get paid 
on the basis of how much gold they obtained and overseers receive a daily or monthly 
allowance. The extent to which the miners are busy had a great impact on the relationship I 
was able to build with them. From the start I established a good relationship with two 
overseers at two different registered mining sites, however in the course of the research period 
I put more emphasis on spending time with the miners. Most of the workers on the mining 
sites including the owners and overseers regarded topics in quite a similar way. However, at 
some (especially registered) mining sites - I did regard a difference between the perspective of 
the overseers and the workers. Therefore, it was beneficial to regard this difference in ranks. 
At these places, I talked to the miners and the overseers separately, thereby trying to 
overcome the ethical concern that people are not voicing their real opinions. 
The reason of becoming close to some of my informants has to do with a mutual 
interest and willingness to talk when meeting each other. Therefore, I did not spend a lot of 
time with initially shy people or people who felt their English was not good enough to 
communicate with me. However, as the research period is only 2,5 months, I felt it was most 
important to continue the research with people I had a good connection with from the start. 
Most of the time with miners on mining sites was spent having mostly informal conversations 
or observing. In the first visits to mining sites I wanted to get acquainted with the miners and 
the mining process, as such not writing down much. However, after a while I usually held my 
notebook in my hands in conversations, enabling me to write down interesting quotes or 
important storylines.  
 
Registered and unregistered mining sites 
Lastly, as I was from the start interested in a comparison between registered and unregistered 
sites, it was of great importance to visit both types of mining sites. There are two aspects 
regarding this issue which need to be addressed here. First of all, during the course of my 
research, my research focus shifted. Before coming to Ghana, I was planning on shedding 
light on the topic of (il)legality from both the perspective of the miners as of the government, 
by also interviewing a few civil servants in both Tarkwa and Accra. However, once in Ghana, 
I was immediately in doubt about this, due to the space barrier. The journey from Tarkwa to 
Accra takes about 6 hours, subsequently complicated by the traffic situation in Accra, as 
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sometimes it is quite difficult to move around due to traffic jams. More importantly, making 
appointments with civil servants already proved to be quite a challenge in Tarkwa, as setting a 
meeting was very difficult and once this had been accomplished, it would easily be cancelled 
on the day of the meeting. Taking the journey to Accra and subsequently taking the risk of not 
meeting someone in Accra, was something that prevented me from holding on to the initial 
research focus. I also noticed that people working on the mining site had interesting and 
diverse stories and challenges, which made me decide to shift my research focus to unraveling 
and understanding the unclearness that I soon noticed surrounded the distinction between 
legal and illegal. I still set up some meetings with a commissioner at the Minerals 
Commission in Tarkwa, who provided me with necessary information regarding views from 
and actions taken by the government against unregistered small-scale mining operations. 
Additionally, I studied newspapers to gain insights into the expressions of national officials 
on small-scale mining.  
Secondly, I had trouble ascertaining whether the informants from the different mining 
operations were operating as a registered or an unregistered site, due to different definitions of 
(il)legality and due to the big differences between several mining sites. However, as I soon 
learned, the differences that could be spotted, such as the size of the operation, did not 
correlate to the legal status of the mining operation, which complicated finding out which site 
was registered or not. In the end, this is where the commissioner of the Minerals Commission 
helped, as he could provide me with information on the registered sites in Tarkwa. 
Consequently, I could ascertain which sites were not registered, which enabled me to draw 
conclusions on differences between registered and unregistered sites, as this is one of the main 
foci of my research.  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter will provide the theoretical insights and concepts on which this research is based 
and on which this research provides insights. Firstly, the notion of governance is elaborated 
on, thereby exemplifying how various actors in the public sphere can influence the supposed 
sovereignty of the state and can produce legitimate authority. Secondly, to report on 
differences between registered and unregistered operations it is of great importance to discuss 
scholarly debates about definitions of (il)legality. Here, the differences between the concepts 
legality, formality and licitness will be discussed, as these will play a role in explaining how 
miners define (il)legality and correspondingly view mining activities they take part in. Here, 
there will be a focus on (il)legality in urban areas, as this research contributes to specific 
knowledge regarding the urban small-scale mining setting. Lastly, as scholars such as G. 
Hilson (2001) put access to employment forward as one of the main benefits of small-scale 
mining and as this is one of the main themes by which registered and unregistered operations 
will be compared, the concept of access is elaborated on.  
 
2.1 Governance, sovereignty and authority  
From the 1970s onwards, scholars reject the single notion of government which suggests that 
the state is one main actor which is in charge. Since, scholars speak of governance, hereby 
also acknowledging the role actors play that traditionally do not belong to the sphere of the 
state. For these actors do play a role in public affairs, and can establish either a juxta 
positional, opposing or complementing relationship to the traditional state (Blundo & Le 
Meur, 2008). The existence of different actors in the public sphere cause differences in, 
amongst others, how the rules for certain government services are produced and controlled 
and how these services are performed. Therefore, Blundo and Le Meur (2008) state that in 
order to get a grip on governance and its actors, there is a need to observe public services and 
the way in which different levels and actors of governance act according to different logics 
and how they interact.  
Taking the nation state as a starting point for government makes sense as “national 
governments claim sovereignty over their territories and the resources therein” (Emel, Huber, 
& Makene, 2011, p. 70). Whilst talking about control over natural resources - in this research 
subterranean gold - there is a “commonsense conception of national-scale resource 
sovereignty” (Emel et al., 2011, p. 71). However, Emel et al. argue that sovereignty is situated 
in many global and local relations and flows of power and capital that can therefore not be 
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delineated (2011). Additionally, Emel et al. argue that sovereignty is rather territorialized at a 
local scale (2011). As such, we must “keep attuned to the ways in which local populations 
living in the spaces of extraction are constantly interrupting state-capital sovereignty projects” 
(Emel et al., 2011, p. 73). 
 The abovementioned insights from Blundo and Le Meur (2008) and Emel et al. (2011) 
link up to the term hybrid governance, which acknowledges how governance practices are a 
hybrid of “externally imposed orders (national policies, global discourses) and existing local 
institutions” as has been stated by Olivier de Sardan in Geenen (2016, p. 7). Geenen 
researches mining concessions and the way in which cohabitation of transnational companies 
and a local community - which itself is made up of a heterogeneous field - “makes for an 
interesting case of hybridity” (2016, p. 7). Hereby she focuses on the way in which the 
various actors produce legitimate authority whilst governing - mostly focusing on establishing 
security and public infrastructure and provisioning of social service. One focal point of 
Geenen (2016)) is the local political dimension. As such, Geenen states that “chiefs, as well as 
other state and non-state actors, engage in a constant struggle to establish and consolidate 
their authority, and to legitimize their governance actions” (2016, p. 6). Heipon, linking to the 
research of Geenen (2016)) therefore describes chiefs as “hybrid governors [... who are] able 
to (continue to) install their own conventions.” (2016, p. 14). 
 Linking Blundo and Le Meur (2008), Emel et al. (2011) and Geenen (2016) we learn 
that the state - by having the rights to the subterranean resources - positions itself as the 
“paramount authority” (Heipon, 2016, p. 13), with their sovereignty highly influenced by both 
global and local, and state and non-state authorities. Heipon’s insights are of great value for 
this research, as she states that “despite the state nominating itself as sovereign authority, 
other non-state authorizers also implement and uphold certain conventions and regulations” 
(Heipon, 2016, p. 14).  
When it comes to the delivery of state services in rural and urban areas by governance 
actors, Geschiere and Gugler, in Blundo and Le Meur argue that the rural/urban division 
should be bypassed and should be considered by seeing it by means of a “connection” and of 
“the flows of individuals, norms, ideas and resources that contribute to the reshaping of the 
issue of collective and public services” (2008, p. 3). This is an important lesson that is taken 
into consideration in this research. Whilst in the rest of the research the emphasis is on the 
fact that the research is conducted in an urban setting, attention will be paid to the way in 
which flows on different scales influence the urban setting.  
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2.2 Distinguishing legality, formality and licitness 
Legality is often strictly linked to nation-states, as the producers of legality within legislative 
frameworks. Here, legality is defined as that which is considered by states to be legitimate 
(Abraham & van Schendel, 2005), therefore in this research legal action is considered action 
that adheres to that which is legal according to the law. As has been showed in the discussion 
in the previous section, state action and performance are influenced by the various actors in 
the public sphere. As such, various scholars reject the dominant image of the state making up- 
and fighting against illegal activities as it gives a simplistic view of reality (Abraham & van 
Schendel, 2005; Elyachar, 2002; Hansen & Vaa, 2004). As such, these scholars show that 
ideas of illegality do not necessarily link up with beliefs and norms that are prevalent in 
society.  
 Hansen and Vaa (2004) state that it has been known that, for a great amount of people 
in urban areas in Africa, economic livelihoods are provided informally, through informal 
work. Hansen and Vaa (2004), in their study on informality in urban Africa, give a short 
history of the terms formal and informal, which gained acknowledgement in the 1970s after 
the International Labour Office - hereafter abbreviated as ILO - used the terminology for its 
case studies. The ILO characterized the term informality on the basis of a few 
characterizations such as ease of entry; family ownership of enterprises; and the small scale of 
the operation (International Labour Office, 1972). Characteristics for the formal sector are 
then, amongst others the following: “difficult entry; corporate ownership; and large scale of 
operation” (International Labour Office, 1972, p. 6). This characterization is interesting as it 
gives certain characteristics that are often linked to characterizations of the terms formality 
and informality, even though in reality these characteristics might not be present, as can be 
seen in this research. Therefore Hansen and Vaa (2004) give another definition of informality, 
which is used in this research, defining informality by means of one characteristic, namely 
extra-legality. Thereby, informality is not linked to a certain level of economic development 
or type of operation, but merely to what it is not, namely that it is not formally included in 
nation-states’ rules and regulations. 
Elyachar, in her article on projects of development, defines the informal economy as 
"a social space in which objects, services, and money are exchanged according to rules of the 
game other than those sanctioned by the state" (2002, p. 496). Her aim is to show how a 
development strategy aimed at developing the informal economy creates a way in which rules 
are not (exclusively) made by the state. In the development discourse, focusing on the 
informal economy therefore leads to more economic activity that is “conducted outside the 
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space over which the state is sovereign” (Elyachar, 2002, p. 509). As such, the notion of 
informality “plays a role in downsizing the nation-state and creating a populace liberated from 
the state" (Elyachar, 2002, p. 509). Applying this notion of Elyachar (2002) to the research on 
formalization of small-scale mining in Ghana, we see the importance to grasp the distinction 
between illegality and informality. Practices or domains of social life that create ingredients 
of economic success, such as unregistered small-scale mining, can be targeted by the state 
once the emphasis is on the ingredients of economic success instead of on the idea that it is 
illegal. To intervene as a state, it is of importance to take away the stamp and idea of illegality, 
for instance in supporting the local civilians. Seeing jobless people as entrepreneurs enables a 
terrain for intervention by the state, for instance by giving them access to capital. Elyachar 
(2002) thereby emphasizes the importance in a language shift from illegal to informal, by 
acknowledging practices of network and social capital and acknowledging people as 
entrepreneurs.  
 Abraham and van Schendel (2005) also reject the dominant imagery of nation-states 
concerning law enforcement and argue that issues of (il)legality should not take the state as a 
definite starting point. They argue that the nation-states' legislative framework is inherently 
implicit, by using vague terminology and allowing for various interpretations of the law, and a 
classification of legal or illegal is therefore not so easily made. Abraham and van Schendel 
(2005), in their article on international crime, propose to make a distinction between what the 
state acknowledges to be according to the law and what people perceive as legitimate, with 
the former being described as legal and the latter as licit. Thereby, Abraham and van Schendel 
state: “when we shift our nomenclature to the distinction between "licit" and "illicit," we refer 
less to the letter of the law than to social perceptions of activities defined as criminal” (2005, 
p. 18). As such, Abraham and van Schendel (2005) state that powerful people and groups 
establish the practices that are considered to be legal and illegal, by struggles over legitimacy. 
Struggles over legitimacy are continuous as “[the struggle] falls short of either winning 
popular consent or fully suppressing criminalized practices. As a result, licit and illicit 
practices coexist in social life and are together imbricated in state processes” (Abraham & van 
Schendel, 2005, p. 7).  
 Heyman clearly states the importance of anthropological insights on the act of defining 
legality, as anthropological scholars are good at “demonstrating the relations of power and 
inequality in the operations and ideologies of law, and exploring ethnographically the 
complicated and ambiguous terrain between legality and illegality” (2013, p. 304). One way 
forward he proposes is seeing illegalization not as “states of being” (Heyman, 2013, p. 304) 
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but as processes, as this makes us regard the underlying classifications that are put in place, 
such as in legalization processes. Along with Elyachar (2002) and Abraham and van Schendel 
(2005), he rejects the division between state and non-state, and rejects the dichotomization 
between the two. Generally, he proposes a middle-range generalization, with for example a 
distinction between types of legalization or illegalization or between certain types of (legal or 
criminal) types of organizations on different levels. As he argues that not all legal and illegal 
activity is equivalent in a moral sense, he proposes that the discussion of (il)legality should be 
based on moral arguments. Here, Heyman (2013) agrees with Abraham and van Schendel 
(2005), however as their distinction between legal and licit is based on a certain social group 
and their perspective, he emphasizes the need to widen and generalize the moral arguments. 
Formality and informality co-exist and interact both in rural and urban settings, but in 
this study the urban setting is highlighted and therefore it is of importance to look at 
informality in the city. Thereby, in 2001 the UN predicted a rise of 2 billion people to existing 
cities and towns in the developing world (UNCHS, 2001). Hansen and Vaa (2004), in their 
study on informality in urban Africa, discuss the informal city, which consists of “extra-legal 
housing and unregistered economic activities” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 7). The formal city 
however is constituted by “urban government and its agents, institutions and rules and 
regulations that over time have been introduced in order to control urban space and economic 
life” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 8). Interestingly, Hansen and Vaa (2004) comment on the 
interfaces of these two types of cities, being formal and informal cities, having to do with 
government policies and practices. Formal and informal cities meet whenever laws are 
adjusted or when enforcement of certain policies is arbitrarily enforced whereas other policies 
are neglected or barely enforced. Additionally, Hansen and Vaa (2004), in conjunction with 
Abraham and van Schendel (2005), state that some practices that are technically illegal can be 
considered legitimate by the actors involved. Therefore, a regulatory system does not make up 
the urban space, as it is “a dynamic field of interaction for economic, social, cultural and 
political processes” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 8). 
 As the creation of jobs is one of the main benefits of small-scale mining (G. Hilson, 
2001) and access to income is one of the focal points in this research, we focus here on extra-
legal economic activities as constituting the informal city.  Hansen and Vaa (2004) reject the 
notion that informality or illegality is necessarily linked to the poor segments of society. They 
state that it is often the case that entrepreneurs who can generally be considered well off gain 
most from the informal businesses they own, while the workers “work under highly 
exploitative conditions with little job security and no legal protection” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, 
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p. 8). Here they state that often informal work goes hand in hand with exploitation of workers. 
However, to reject the informal economy because of its possible negative consequences 
ignores the potential of the informal sector to provide access to income to many. The 
International Labour Organization ILO has coined the ‘dilemma of the informal sector’, that 
centres around the question whether the informal sector should be “promoted as a provider of 
employment and incomes or should regulation and social protection be extended to it, thereby 
possibly reducing its capacity to provide jobs and incomes?” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 16).  
To be able to get access to income in the mining sector, be it at a formal or an informal 
mining site, means to be able to benefit from the work that can be done. This relates to the 
notion of access, which is described below, to get a grip on the question of access to income 
in the formal and informal economy. 
 The mentioned discussion on the different concepts of legality, formality and licitness 
will prove to be useful in this research, as it clearly distinguishes between that which is legal 
in the lawful sense - being considered by the state to be legitimate - and that which is 
considered to be illegal by the state. What the scholars however point to is the need to view 
not only that which is considered legal by the state, but what people engaging in these to be 
considered illegal activities perceive as legitimate - which are considered licit activities. This 
opens up room for nuance and does justice to the different moral perspectives of various 
actors in the mining sector. This viewpoint is of great importance, as the focus of this research 
is providing a grassroots perspective on (il)legality. Therefore, both the concept of licitness 
and legality in the lawful sense - in this research mentioned as registered and unregistered - 
will be utilized in this research. 
 
2.3 The concept of access and the mechanisms that shape it 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) in their article on notions of access state first of all that it is of 
importance to note the differences between the notions of access and property. They define 
access as "the ability to benefit from things—including material objects, persons, institutions, 
and symbols" (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 153). Property has been characterized by MacPherson, 
as stated in Ribot and Peluso as "a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to some use or 
benefit of something" (2003, p. 155). Property rights theorists have broadened property rights 
literature by not only considering formal property rights, but by considering collective 
resources and how these are ingrained in political and economic relationships (Ribot & Peluso, 
2003). Ribot & Peluso frame access even more broadly by stating that instead of focusing on 
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rights as has been done with property theorists, the focus on an ability [to benefit] “brings 
attention to a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit 
from resources” (2003, p. 154). Therefore the difference between an ability and a right is that 
an ability refers to access whereas a right refers to property. Property then is one way of 
obtaining access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). In this research on formalization of small-scale 
mining in Ghana, a license is a concession to abstract ore from the soil, which can be seen as a 
property. Also, licenses provide property rights to the owners, but obtaining a license is still a 
process of access to the application and granting of licenses.  
 As the concept of access is a way to analyse who benefits in what way, this notion of 
access is of importance to research who benefits from the policy of formalization. In theories 
of access it is of great importance to consider the powers which influence the way in which 
people can benefit. Ghani, as stated in Ribot & Peluso argues that people and institutions draw 
on different “bundles of powers” (2003, p. 158), during different times and on different scales, 
thereby altering power relations and ways of access. Here, Ribot & Peluso draw on Foucault 
as he pointed out that “power has as much to do with positionality and the particular 
imbrications of men and things as with the formal powers that people might hold” (2003, p. 
158). To pay attention to the fact that certain people and institutions handle and control access 
- thereby being a mechanism of access - whilst others are dependent on gaining access 
through those who have control, is of great importance to see the process of access as being 
dynamic (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). As Ribot and Peluso state: "access analysis also helps us 
understand why some people or institutions benefit from resources, whether or not they have 
rights to them" (2003, p. 154). 
 Ribot and Peluso (2003) finally also provide ways in which access mechanisms and 
the corresponding power relations can be categorized, such as rights-based access, and 
structural and relational access mechanisms. Regarding rights-based access, when someone 
has the right to something based on the law, these are commonly regarded as property, 
including access via the holding of, as is applicable in this research, licenses. Besides rights 
attributed by law there are other rights-based ways of benefiting from resources. As such, 
illegal access, “the enjoyment of benefits from things in ways that are not socially sanctioned 
by state and society” (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 164), is also a way of retrieving access to 
resources. Access to technology is one aspect that is mentioned by Ribot and Peluso (2003), 
as technology, such as the use of certain tools, is often indispensable when extracting the 
concerned resource. Another important aspect for this research is the access to labour or 
labour opportunities, as resources may be gained by becoming an employee of the one who 
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controls access to the resource (Ribot & Peluso, 2003), which in this research can be the 
license holder. As such, the concept of access provides a tool for thinking about the ability to 
conduct mining activities and how this relates to the need to have access to for instance 
capital, technology and knowledge about mining practices. 
 
The common thread that follows from the various theoretical notions that have been 
elaborated on, is the need to focus not only on formal authority or property, but on expanding 
our notions of government and property beyond formalities. Focusing merely on either the 
state as one actor, legality as produced by the state or formal property rights does not do 
justice to the variety of actors influencing and participating in these processes and concepts. 
Rather, focusing on governance, various concepts of legality, formality and licitness and on 
access instead of property opens up room for nuance and does justice to the different 
perspectives of various actors. 
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Chapter 3 Scholars versus reality: scholarly consensus on formalization and 
the miners’ discrepant notions of (il)legality 
After elaborating on the theoretical notions that form the basis of this research, the following 
chapter will first of all provide insights into the scholarly consensus on the need to formalize 
the small-scale mining sector. As the focus of the research however is specifically on the 
perspective of miners, the remainder of this chapter will contrast these scholarly ideas with 
the practice of how miners regard (il)legality. Hereby, insights will be given into the way in 
which miners construct and utilize various definitions of (il)legality.  
 
3.1 Scholarly consensus in favor of formalizing the small-scale mining sector 
The small-scale mining sector is generally considered to cause “high social and environmental 
costs” (Salo et al., 2016, p. 1058), such as causing environmental pollution and deforestation 
and with its workers working under poor working conditions, including conducting dangerous 
work. Most small-scale gold mining activities in the world are “part of the extralegal economy” 
(Siegel & Veiga, 2009, p. 52). However, there is a growing consensus amongst scholars and 
policy makers that efforts to develop the small-scale mining sector should be focused on and 
will be aided by formalizing the small-scale mining sector (Siegel & Veiga, 2009). 
Formalization is defined here as “absorbing existing customary practices - developed 
informally by miners - into the mainstream of a country’s legal and economic affairs” (Siegel 
& Veiga, 2009, p. 51). It is of importance to differentiate between legalization and 
formalization, as formalization is not only focused on putting in place policy and regulatory 
frameworks in order to legalize the small-scale mining activities. McQuilken and Hilson 
argue that “the extent to which such laws and regulations are successfully activated, 
implemented, and enforced by the relevant authorities is also central to the formalization 
process” (2016, p. 10).   
 Siegel and Veiga argue that the importance of formalization lies in the establishment 
and recognition of rights to miners, who are then recognized as “having the right to mine” 
(2009, p. 52). Looking at the matter from a - mostly - economic viewpoint, Siegel and Veiga 
(2009) argue that formal miners are more likely to obtain access to capital and governmental 
support, to improve their operations and as such create a more sustainable operation. This 
relates to Ribot and Peluso (2003) who argue that an ability refers to access whereas a right 
refers to property. By formalizing the mining sector, miners can handle and control access 
themselves, instead of being dependent on gaining access through those who have control – 
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be it the ones who are in possession of the property rights (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Besides a 
transferral of rights upon formalizing the operation, duties are also imposed on miners such as 
complying with certain labour rights and environmental standards. The assumption is 
therefore that formalization will lead to miners abiding to social and environmental norms.  
 Formalization does not only impact miners, it also influences governmental actors. 
Salo et al. argue that formalization “provides a platform to better govern and consequently 
manage the social and environmental impacts of mining (i.e., to minimize its negative impacts, 
and to harness its positive impacts)” (2016, p. 1058). This can be explained by the fact that 
governments are better able to register and track formalized mining activity. As such, 
formalization is often desired by governments as it provides them with a tool by which the 
accompanied social and environmental impacts can better be controlled.  
Therefore Siegel and Veiga argue that formalization is often a “win-win situation for 
both miners and the state” (2009, p. 52). Upon formalization, miners are empowered by 
gaining property rights, providing them with stability in two ways. Miners are then aware of 
the costs of taxation, instead of being insecure about the amount of bribes that need to be paid 
- being hidden costs. Secondly, Siegel and Veiga argue that it “reduces stress over the cost of 
rebuilding after military actions taken against them” (2009, p. 52). Additionally, the 
government gains extra taxation income and is able to reduce “vulnerability for a part of the 
population and the environment” (Siegel & Veiga, 2009, p. 52). 
In spite of this scholarly consensus in favour of formalizing, it is clear that 
formalization efforts are not invariably welcomed and accepted by miners. Salo et al. (2016) 
argue that formalization schemes often do not sufficiently take into account the perspective of 
the local mining sector and its actors. Often, formalization efforts then “inevitably disrupt and 
seek to break already existing habits and practices” (Salo et al., 2016, p. 1059). Salo et al. 
(2016) show how small-scale mining formalization efforts in Peru have not offered any 
benefits for miners and how the formalization process is resisted by miners. Whilst 
conducting the research, Salo et al. (2016) have however seen participatory miners willing to 
locally design and implement policies that are beneficial to both miners and government. 
Therefore, Salo et al. (2016) argue that in the process of formalization, more emphasis should 
be put on the way in which institutions and formalization practises are perceived by miners, 
thereby allowing the formalization process to be governed more as a bottom-up process.  
As such, in the next section light will be shed on the way in which formalization of the 
small-scale mining sector is perceived by small-scale miners in Tarkwa. This will clearly 
show the difference between scholarly ideas about formalization versus the outcome of 
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formalization processes in practice, by means of providing a ‘grassroots’ perspective. 
Therefore, I will provide insights into the way in which miners construct and utilize various 
definitions of (il)legality. 
 
3.2 Miners’ discrepant notions of (il)legality 
What follows from the scholarly debates about formalization is that informal practices should 
be absorbed into the legal framework of a country (Siegel & Veiga, 2009).  The Ghanaian 
government has facilitated this formalization process by establishing the Small-scale Gold 
Mining Law. This legal framework makes a distinction between legal and illegal small-scale 
mining activities on the basis of whether or not the small-scale mining site is in the possession 
of a license to mine the subsoil. This governmental framework will be elaborated on in the 
following chapter. Here, the way in which miners perceive (il)legality is elaborated on, as it 
provides a clear break with scholarly insights into formalization and provides essential 
insights into the practice of formalization policy.  
Especially during the start of the fieldwork in Tarkwa, I had trouble ascertaining 
whether I was at a registered or an unregistered site. Interestingly enough, I soon noticed that 
this was fed by responses of miners I talked to, due to a discrepancy and ambiguity when it 
comes to definitions of (il)legality of small-scale mining sites. Miners mostly do not conform 
or adhere to the definition of (il)legality which is provided by the legal framework. Several 
miners expressed the fact that alluvial mining is - in their view - illegal, whereas shaft mining 
and surface mining is not. Therefore, a lot of miners responded that the mining activities they 
were undertaking were legal, as their activities did not involve alluvial mining. There were 
some miners who defined legality in terms of the possession of a license - as legality in the 
lawful sense -, but linking up alluvial practices to illegal practices was a more common 
response. An initial fear that arose in me was that people felt unsafe or insecure to express the 
fact that they were working at an unregistered site and therefore argued that they were in fact 
working at a registered operation. However, when asking miners that regarded themselves as 
legal because they were not conducting alluvial mining, they expressed the fact that all mining 
sites in Tarkwa are registered, as they do not pollute water as there is no to hardly any alluvial 
mining activity in Tarkwa.  
 Additionally, a few informants also used another definition of (il)legality, which to a 
great extent has to do with the different levels of authority in the Ghanaian society. 
Traditional authorities play a significant role in the government structure and are able to assert 
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local autonomy “against the globalizing and modernizing power of the state” (Ubink, 2007, p. 
127). Additionally, Luning and Pijpers (forthcoming) have argued that the support of 
Ghanaian local chiefs is often required when working out an arrangement concerning access 
of small-scale miners to resources. Hereby they state that “the [large-scale] company may 
officially own the concession and mineral rights, but local artisanal miners consider their 
appropriation of this resource legitimate and see their chief as the appropriate authority” 
(Luning & Pijpers, forthcoming, p. 2). I have also observed this in Tarkwa. Some miners 
stated that they were operating at a legal/registered mine because the land belongs to the chief 
and the chief accords the mining activities taking place. Here, a conflict evolves between 
traditional authorities such as chiefs and the central government, making this another factor 
where ambiguity of the definition of (il)legality comes up.  
 Adding to the ambiguity of the definition of (il)legality, is the way in which the term 
galamsey is used in multiple ways by various actors. In the scholarly literature and in 
expressions by the national government, galamsey refers to miners working on unregistered 
small-scale mining sites, coming from the term “gather them [the gold] and sell” (Amankwah 
and Anim-Sackey 2003: 132). Galamsey miners therefore refers to those miners who work on 
a mining site that is not licensed. However, interestingly, I have found that the definition is 
used in multiple ways. When it comes to definitions by small-scale miners themselves, the 
term galamsey does not solely represent miners on unregistered sites. In practice, a lot of the 
informants in Tarkwa referred to galamsey as workers who mainly use their manpower to do 
the work instead of using - either any type or big and heavy - machinery and equipment. As 
such, there were informants who referred to themselves or others as galamsey, whom however 
did work on a registered mining site. Additionally, this complicated the process of 
acknowledging which mining sites were registered or unregistered. Whenever someone 
referred to himself or others as galamsey I could not deduce from this if this was then a 
registered or an unregistered site. Therefore, as there is disagreement regarding the term 
galamsey between scholars and government officials versus usages of the word by small-scale 
miners themselves, I will refer in this thesis to the small-scale mining informants as either 
workers on registered or unregistered sites. This represents their activity and their legal status 
and does not use an ambiguous or unclear term which miners themselves use with another 
meaning. 
The variety of definitions and usages of (il)legality amongst miners and between 
miners and the government shown here exemplifies how issues of (il)legality should not take 
the state as a definite starting point as this does not reflect the views of the subjects of the law. 
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In this case, a clear difference can be observed between that which is according to the law and 
what people perceive to be legitimate, with the former being described as legal and the latter 
as licit (Abraham & van Schendel, 2005). In this case it is most clearly shown that miners 
thought of their work to be legitimate, as many expressed that they were not destroying the 
water bodies. This explains how it happens that even though the operation certain miners are 
working on is unregistered - thus illegal in the lawful sense -, miners themselves consider 
their work to be legitimate. It can be stated that the practice of how miners regard (il)legality 
is not static, but rather fluid. 
In the literature, Heyman suggests to view legalization as a process instead of “a state 
of being” (2013, p. 304) thereby opting for the need to explore legality and illegality 
processes on the basis of morality. This process appears to be enacted by actors in the mining 
sector. As many miners see alluvial mining as wasteful and destructive to the environment, 
they distinguish between different types of mining and attach a different status to different 
types of mining. Miners therefore seem to be making their own moral arguments when it 
comes to illegality. Heyman argues that “not all illegalities are morally equivalent” (2013, p. 
305), and interestingly, this notion seems to be applied in the views of miners. The term fluid 
legality is introduced here, which is twofold. Besides the fact that the concept of legality is 
fluid - in the sense that there is a discrepant usage of the concept - fluid legality also refers to 
the moral judgments of miners condemning alluvial practices as illegal.  
 
Introducing possible causes for the discrepant notion of (il)legality 
Why miners distinguish between legality and illegality on the basis of morality is amongst 
others to be explained whilst regarding the way in which alluvial mining is portrayed in the 
press and by the government, as will be elaborated on in chapter 4. As such, in expressions of 
national governmental actors such as the president on unregistered small-scale mining, the 
destructive nature of alluvial practices on water bodies is emphasized. It is interesting to see 
how these expressions on alluvial mining appeared to have trickled down to miners. Relating 
to this is the interesting observation that alluvial mining seems to be generally regarded as 
very bad for Ghana by a large part of the population. In conversations about the type of 
research I was conducting it happened mostly that people  - both miners but also people I met 
otherwise such as shop owners, members of the community of Boboobo that I was living in or 
Ghanaian citizens  I met during travelling - expressed how destructive and negative the small-
scale mining activities are for Ghana. Thereby most people immediately referred to the 
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spoiled rivers, which indicates that illegal alluvial mining is a topic which is very visible, and 
therefore is especially problematized.  
One important factor to regard whilst trying to explain the discrepancy in the 
definition of (il)legality is the way in which small-scale miners view governmental 
intervention as a whole. As the government makes the distinction between legality and 
illegality in the lawful sense - by providing the lawful framework -, it is interesting to see how 
miners actually view government in a general sense and the role the government plays in the 
mining sector. This provides an understanding about the way in which the government is able 
- or rather seems not to be able - to assure its authority, thereby causing ideas about 
(il)legality not to be mirrored in society. Finally, another topic to regard in explaining the 
discrepancy of the definition of (il)legality is the way in which local law implementers 
interpret and subsequently implement the legal framework of small-scale mining. Both topics 
will be elaborated on in the following chapter. 
 
This chapter has provided essential insights into on the one hand the scholarly arguments in 
favor of formalizing the small-scale mining sector and on the other hand the practice of the 
notion of (il)legality and the way in which this is defined in discrepant ways. Scholars often 
consider formalization to be a “win-win situation for both miners and the state” (Siegel & 
Veiga, 2009, p. 52), as it empowers miners and enables governments to better manage both 
negative and positive impacts of the sector, besides gaining additional governmental income. 
However, from the literature it already follows that formalization practice is mostly not so 
straightforwardly positive. Salo et al. (2016) argue that formalization schemes do not 
sufficiently take into account the local mining actors’ perspective. This research strengthens 
and adheres to this argument, as it has become clear that miners make up (il)legality on the 
basis of their own moral arguments, which in many cases leads to viewing alluvial mining 
practices as illegal. As such, the term ‘fluid legality’ has been introduced, referring to both the 
fact that legality is not a definitive notion and the fact that miners make up the notion of 
(il)legality on the basis of the distinction between alluvial versus non-alluvial mining. This 
discrepancy provides us with essential insights for the implementation of formalization policy. 
To enjoy the benefits of formalization policy as noted by scholars, there is a need to take into 
account this discrepancy, to ensure that policy and practice are properly connected. As such, it 
can be warranted that policy actually reflects practice. 
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Chapter 4 The role of governmental actors in formalizing the small-scale 
mining sector 
Insight has been gained into the scholarly arguments in favor of formalizing the sector, 
contrasted by the discrepant usages of the concept of (il)legality by small-scale miners. Now it 
is time to shed light on the way in which the Ghanaian government has tried to put 
formalization into reality, by elaborating on the small-scale mining law. To gain more insights 
into the governmental efforts of formalizing the sector, the process of obtaining a license will 
be addressed, along with its corresponding challenges. Subsequently, a view of the practice of 
law enforcement is provided, thereby elaborating on how powerful and effective the 
government actors seem to be in implementing policies, firstly on a general level and 
thereafter specifically elaborating on the policy of formalizing the small-scale mining sector. 
Finally, the practice of the local law implementers in Tarkwa will be elaborated on. As such, 
this chapter will show how the discrepancy of the concept of (il)legality is both caused by and 
adhered to by governmental actors.  
 
4.1  The small-scale mining law typified  
The small-scale mining sector has until 1989 been regarded by the government as an informal 
sector, regardless of the thousands of people working in the sector (G. Hilson, 2001). As such, 
until then miners conducted, in the state’s perspective, largely unmonitored, uncontrolled and 
unregulated practices, and received little to no support from the government (G. Hilson, 2001). 
As a direct response to the general economic decline of the 1980s, the national Economic 
Recovery Plan was implemented in 1983, with the main objective to “remove the barriers 
hindering the growth of export earnings” (G. Hilson, 2002a, p. 23). To do justice to the 
interconnectedness of places, as showed by Gupta and Ferguson (2007), it must be noted that 
both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were consulted whilst drafting the 
plan. During the 1980s Ghana additionally underwent the Structural Adjustment Programs of 
these two institutions, receiving loans on the basis of enacting neoliberal policies. As such, in 
the Economic Recovery Plan, foreign investment in mining was promoted, amongst others 
through tax benefits for foreign investors. Correspondingly, in 1989, the Ghanaian 
government developed the Small-scale Gold Mining Law, which in the meantime has been 
amended several times with the last alteration taking place in 2006, upon the establishment of 
the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (Bansah et al., 2016). This legal framework makes up 
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the formalization policy of the government and as such it enables mining operations to 
transition from the extralegal to the legal sector.  
One of the main arguments for the Ghanaian government to formalize the small-scale 
mining sector is the additional income it provides for the government, as before the 
formalization efforts a lot of tax revenue was lost through smuggling routes and illegal trade 
(G. Hilson, 2001, p. 4). When the Small-scale Gold Mining Law was established in 1989, the 
sector was perceived as labor-intensive, performed by uneducated people. The government of 
Ghana believed that the formalizing the small-scale mining sector would be an “income 
generating solution” (Ferring, Hausermann, & Effah, 2016, p. 173), thereby ensuring 
economic sustainability for Ghanaians. This belief comes from the fact that Ghanaians would 
be able to invest in mining without the enjoyment of large capital and the plan to make large 
investments. As such it could be regarded as a pro-poor initiative (Ferring et al., 2016).  
As Ferring et al. (2016) state, the characterization of the small-scale mining as only 
having access to low levels of technology, mechanization and capital investment and being 
labor intensive is not only utilized on the national level but is amplified on an international 
level, by policy documents of for instance the World Bank. Banchirigah and Hilson, as 
mentioned in Ferring et al. (2016) emphasize that both states and international bodies have 
characterized the formalization of small-scale mining as a pro-poor initiative which may be 
utilized as an income-generating solution to further amongst others poverty alleviation. By 
using these characterizations as a starting point, policy plans - as described in policy 
documents of the World Bank - often require “certain (often predetermined) forms of 
expertise and intervention to create “efficient” and “profitable” development opportunities” 
(Ferring et al., 2016, p. 173). However, from 1989 to now the small-scale mining sector has 
developed and the classification of small-scale mining as a poverty-driven sector with 
uneducated workers utilizing no to little technology does not do justice to the small-scale 
mining sector anymore. As such, these various policy documents overlook and deny the 
complexity of the small-scale mining sector, which has been developing greatly over the past 
decades.  
Besides establishing legality and illegality, formalization efforts have also emphasized 
or resulted in various unequal social power relations that make up the small-scale mining 
sector. As such, the Small-scale mining law emphasizes the unequal power relation between 
the government and the people of Ghana. Ownership of the minerals in the subsoil belongs to 
the state and “is vested in the President in trust for the people of Ghana” (Minerals 
Commission, 2006: section 1). As such, the President, as the head of the state, is given the 
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authority over the available minerals, who has subsequently transferred the authority to grant 
licenses to the Minister. Interestingly, when granted a license in order to conduct small-scale 
mining activities, one obtains access to mine the subsoil, where the minerals are located. This 
right therefore initially belongs to the state, making this a system of ‘subterranean sovereignty’ 
(Luning & Pijpers, forthcoming). The corresponding wealth also initially belongs to the state 
and Luning and Pijpers therefore regard the state as “the ultimate owner of subsoil mineral 
wealth” (forthcoming, p. 3). The right to the minerals in the subsoil that is transferred to 
individuals obtaining a license is temporal, as a license is initially obtained for a maximum of 
five years. In short, access is granted, but property rights are not transferred. This is one 
example of how the law emphasizes the different social relations in the mining sector. 
 
4.1.1 Becoming a registered operation and its corresponding challenges 
As more insights have been gained into the legal framework of small-scale mining and its 
intended effects, it is noteworthy to realize that the illegal small-scale mining sector in Ghana 
is however very large. To try to get a grasp of the unregistered sector and its “ubiquitous” 
nature, as it has been described by G. Hilson and Potter (2003), the process of acquiring a 
license will be elaborated on here. In the Mining and Mineral Act of 2006 it is stated that a 
small-scale mining license can solely be attained by Ghanaian citizens above the age of 18. 
This provision is an attempt to assure that the formalization process is beneficial for Ghanaian 
citizens, for instance in ensuring access to income generating opportunities. As such, it can be 
concluded that the Ghanaian government is well aware of the importance as well as the 
potential of the small-scale mining sector for access to income for Ghanaian citizens. This 
relates to the scholarly argument in favor of formalizing the small-scale mining sector, as one 
of the main positive impacts of small-scale mining is the provision of employment, as the 
sector generates “socially inclusive economic growth contributing to poverty reduction” (Salo 
et al., 2016, p. 1058).  
Additionally, the applicant must go through a number of administrative stages in order 
to obtain the license, which are discussed by G. Hilson and Potter (2003). The costs will be 
mentioned too, which are derived from the list of fees - in dollars stated - that is mentioned on 
“Ghana’s Mining Portal”, on the page describing the Minerals Rights, Licenses, Permits and 
Procedures (Ghana's Mining Portal, 2017). First of all, the applicant must submit ten copies of 
an application form to the small-scale mining district center in the vicinity. This costs 70 US 
dollars. Subsequently, an environmental permit must be obtained from the Environmental 
Protection Agency. The application is sent to the Minister of Miners to be approved, after 
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which a processing fee of 150 US dollars must be paid. Finally when a formal approval is 
given, the applicant is required to pay 1000 US dollars for the approval. 
 In the literature it has been stated that the process of acquiring a license to legally 
mine is “cumbersome and highly inefficient which strongly discourages miners from 
registering” (Teschner, 2012, p. 308). Additionally, it is mentioned that registering practices 
involve high fees and a great amount of paperwork, which is often a great barrier, amongst 
others because of the fact that many miners are illiterate (G. Hilson & Potter, 2003). This is an 
observation I also made in the field. Many miners were for instance not able to properly write 
down their name or the name of the mining site we were on at that moment. The various 
stages in the application process cause the process to take a long time. G. Hilson and Potter 
(2003) state that this process is known to take at least a year. In this case it is important to 
note that the license is obtained for just 5 years, after which the license should be extended.  
Additionally, miners are mostly required to go to Accra to obtain the necessary 
information regarding the availability of parcels of land (G. Hilson & Potter, 2003). The lack 
of decentralization in all stages of the application is often described as burdensome by 
applicants (G. Hilson & Potter, 2003). Another articulated problem - in this case by a 
professor from the University of Mines and Technology in Tarkwa and adhered to by several 
miners - is the fact that miners are not allowed to conduct a reconnaissance mission before 
applying for a license. As small-scale mining operations are not allowed to do exploration on 
the field they consider as their possible prospective mining site, they are unable to ascertain if 
and to which extent there is mineralization underground. Imaginably it is a big problem for 
companies to start digging a hole and apply for a license without being reassured of the fact 
that the place bears gold, in order for the company to be able to reclaim the money they invest.  
 
4.1.2 Current government’s expressions: stop (alluvial) galamsey operations 
The current government of Ghana, led by president Nana Akufo-Addo, has expressed the aim 
to stop all miners working on unregistered small-scale mining sites, or galamsey - as workers 
on unregistered small-scale miners are referred to in most newspaper articles. As such, the 
current government has launched a campaign to discourage people from conducting 
unregistered small-scale mining activities. Additionally, the government has announced a 
comprehensive approach, with the objective of - as stated by the president Akufo-Addo - 
“dealing with this phenomenon once and for all in our country”. (Brako-Powers, 2017a).  
An active stance from the government against galamsey is not to be taken for granted. 
As such, the former government, led by president John Mahama, is criticized for its lack of  
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actions taken against galamsey, as “his failure to deal with illegal mining has led to the 
destruction of the water bodies that serve as source of drinking water for millions of 
Ghanaians” (Agyemang Asante, 2016). However, in 2013 he has set up the still existing Inter-
Ministerial Taskforce on Illegal Mining, as a partnership between assemblies on the 
metropolitan, municipal and district level together with regional - and district security 
councils. The Taskforce has the task to conduct “sweeps of unlicensed and informal mining 
operations to arrest and deport illegally operating foreign miners, clamp down on galamsey 
operators, and seize equipment” (McQuilken & Hilson, 2016, p. 28). These law enforcing 
agencies are therefore authorized to officially stop unregistered small-scale mining activities 
from taking place. In 2016 the Minerals Commission however argued that “the taskforce has 
failed to flush out activities of galamseyers whose activities are the results of the current water 
problem in the country” (Today Newspaper, 2016).  
It is interesting to see how expressions of national officials emphasize the destructive 
nature of - specifically - alluvial mining practices. There seems to be a sole focus on the 
destruction of water bodies, with many newspaper articles that report on messages from 
national officials addressing the unregistered activities and thereafter immediately pointing to 
the pollution of water bodies (Brako-Powers, 2017b; Kenu, 2017; The Statesman, 2017). 
Thereby they give examples of rivers drying up such as the Tano River or the Brim River 
which is being muddied (Brako-Powers, 2017b). In an article of The Statesman from 27-04-
2017 it is described how the current President of Ghana addressed his population regarding 
problems of galamsey, saying that “mining along the water bodies cannot continue if we want 
to preserve nature and our water” (The Statesman, 2017). Additionally, another article 
describes the expressions of Lands and Natural Resources Minister John Peter Amewu who 
says “political bigwigs who allegedly front for prospective investors to engage in illegal 
mining and destroy water bodies will not be spared” (Kenu, 2017). In these, and numerous 
other articles, it is striking how much emphasis is placed on the destruction of water bodies. 
Here it becomes clear that galamsey are framed as causing degradation of the environment as 
a whole - however especially focusing on the destruction of water bodies. 
 
4.2 Perspective on governmental intervention from small-scale miners 
After elaborating on the legal framework and the current governments’ expressions, it is 
interesting to regard the governments’ effectiveness in implementing their policies. This will 
be elaborated on by respectively mentioning the lack of trust in and opportunities generated 
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by government, the lack of expectancy of governmental action and the insignificant role the 
government plays in supporting registered small-scale mining sites. 
 
4.2.1 Lack of trust in government 
During the fieldwork, I was constantly struck by the lack of confidence in and satisfaction 
regarding governmental services. In the first conversation with most miners, and for that 
matter most non-miners as well, the topic of Ghanaian government came up. It was mostly the 
case that people were very keen on going to another, namely Western, country to work or live. 
As I am from the Netherlands, I was asked how to get a visa for the Netherlands many times. 
Most miners and non-miners that I met that voiced a wish to leave Ghana did so because of 
the lack of opportunities in the country. People expressed the government’s unwillingness to 
help young people with finding and creating jobs and the lack of following-up on plans that 
are suggested - for instance when it comes to innovative water storing ideas. Additionally, 
people expressed that policies that are put in place are not well implemented and policed, 
which causes these policies to fail. The lack of trust in governmental officials is exemplified 
by the story of one of my informants, a gold buyer in Tarkwa. He is a registered buyer and is 
therefore required to pay taxes once a year. As such, governmental officials will come by his 
office to collect the taxes. However, my informant said that he will never pay the officials at 
that moment, as he does not trust the money to be handed in (fully) to the tax authorities. 
Therefore, the informant stated that he will always go to the local tax authorities himself to 
pay his taxes there.  
 
4.2.2 No governmental action expected 
The abovementioned quote exemplifies the general view of Ghanaians towards the national 
government, which seems to coincide with the insignificant role the national government 
ostensibly plays when it comes to the mining sector. As such, views on government support to 
registered small-scale mining operations were scarcely voiced. Exemplifying this is the fact 
that it only occurred once that a miner on itself voiced the wish for the government to change 
the situation, which in this case revolved around the flood of the underground shafts due to 
too much water. During the rest of the fieldwork, upon encountering dozens of problems on 
various mining sites, there was no one who voiced hopes of action or change from (part of) 
the government. Generally, it seemed as if government actors were not considered as a factor 
that could influence their situation in any way. This can be understood using Elyachar’s 
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notion of the informal economy, whereby more economic activity takes place “outside the 
space over which the state is sovereign” (2002, p. 509) thereby downsizing the nation-state.  
Relating to the mining sector, but also very much to general views of government in 
Ghana, is the following response to a question of frequency of check-ups on a washing site, 
conducted by the district office of the Minerals Commission. The informant, being the owner 
of the washing site, responded with “this is Africa”, saying this as a statement on its own, 
needing no further explanation. After asking him to elaborate on this statement, he said the 
government is not able to implement, maintain and check up on policies. This seems to be the 
general view on government as it is shared by many if not most people I have met. 
 
4.2.3 The government’s insignificant role in the mining sector 
One of the benefits of formalizing the sector, as stated in the literature, is that government 
would be better able to manage the positive impacts of small-scale mining, besides 
minimizing negative effects, such as social and environmental impacts (Salo et al., 2016). 
This is however not the overall view that has resulted from this research. Besides the general 
views on the insignificant role the government seems to play in the daily life of the population, 
miners elaborated on the government’s role concerning specific processes in the small-scale 
mining sector. As such, one story from the two registered small-scale mining sites that are 
part of this research will be elaborated on. These stories will exemplify the insignificant role 
the government plays in supporting registered small-scale mining sites
2
. 
 
Stejoan Mining Group 
Stejoan - as the site will be named from here on out - is one of the two registered small-scale 
mining sites I have included in this research, which has been registered by two investors both 
Tarkwa and Accra. Normally, over 100 miners work at this site, making it a rather large site. 
However, the level of technological equipment that is used is rather low, in comparison to the 
other registered site which has Chinese investors. Informants at Stejoan - both miners and 
overseers at the site - stated that the site ran into trouble two years back, as a result of the fact 
that the electricity bill had not been paid for. As the electricity bill had not been paid for, the 
pumps that usually pump out the water from the underground shafts were not working. This 
obstructed the mining activities as water needs to be pumped out in order to properly mine the 
                                                          
2
 Both sites are regarded as small-scale as they have small-scale mining concessions. However, sometimes  I was 
struck by the relative medium-scale of the operations. Some informants argued that the government was working 
on legislation on medium-scale mining. 
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underground shafts with its low underground levels. Stejoan, with over 100 miners working 
on the site at that time, was unable to continue their operations. For about 1,5 years the miners 
were either unable to go down into the shafts or later during the 1,5 years could only reach a 
certain level underground, which did not contain a lot of gold. During the fieldwork, I was 
struck by all the externalities that caused mining operations to shut down, for different 
amounts of time, ranging from just a day to several years. As one of the supposed benefits of 
formalization policy is the fact that governments are better able to manage the positive 
impacts of small-scale mining - such as access to income - it could be assumed that there 
would be support from the government to enable registered operation to continue its work. 
However, when asking the miners on the site for the support they had obtained from the 
government, they were not able to give me any answers.  
 
Mohammed & Co Mining 
Mohammed & Co is the second registered small-scale mining site that is part of this research. 
Mohammed & Co differs from Stejoan mostly due to the fact that the company hired Chinese 
contractors who brought in Chinese technical equipment. Interesting in this case is the fact 
that Mohammed & Co is made up of two different organizational mining sites, together 
however comprising the small-scale mining site Mohammed & Co and working on the same 
small-scale mining concession. One part consists of Ghanaians working with Chinese 
investors/contractors that have access to more technological equipment, which consequently 
will be called the Chinese part of the operation. This is also how the main informant - being 
an overseer at the site - called that part of the operation. The other part of the small-scale 
mining operation consists of galamsey - which is how the informant himself called these 
workers -, that rely on low levels of technology to conduct the mining activities. 
In the Chinese part of the company, Chinese contractors were in charge of a great deal 
of the company, amongst others supplying technology but also of arranging - both Chinese 
and Ghanaian - personnel. My informant told me that the Chinese contractor gets up to 90% 
of the earnings for the work they do, whereas the Ghanaian part of the company only receives 
the other 10%. I asked the informant if the government knows about this arrangement and if 
they - in his eyes - would mind this arrangement. The informant responded to this by saying 
“no they do not mind, because on paper it is a Ghanaian who holds the license and they make 
money”. The informant believed that as a Ghanaian holds the license, the national government 
therefore does not seem concerned about who does the work and who consequently gains 
from this. As such, in spite of the limitation in the law that enables solely Ghanaians to obtain 
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a license, small-scale mining sites can be mostly beneficial to non-Ghanaians. This 
exemplifies how the legal governmental framework for small-scale mining is not solely or 
mostly beneficial for Ghanaian and how the government seems to play an insignificant role in 
this process. 
In sum, it is clear - from both from the general perspective on governmental 
intervention and the role the government specifically plays in the small-scale mining sector - 
that miners do not rely on governmental support in both their daily life and whilst conducting 
small-scale mining activities. There is a lack of trust in governmental actors and miners do not 
expect governmental action to be taken. Additionally, the minor role the government plays in 
supporting registered small-scale mining sites is exemplified by reviewing the case of the two 
registered sites that have been part of this research. Showing the insignificant role the 
government plays helps in explaining why miners adhere to discrepant definitions of 
(il)legality. As the government makes up such a minor role in the daily life of miners, the 
legal framework provided by the government does not prove to be an influential factor in 
constructing (il)legality. As such, governmental ideas about (il)legality are not mirrored in 
society and miners rather construct their own ideas of (il)legality. 
 
4.3 The perspectives and actions of local governmental actors 
After giving an overview of the perspective on governmental intervention from small-scale 
miners, including shortly elaborating on the two registered sites and the way in which miners 
view governmental input in these operations, a light will be shed on the main local law 
enforcers in Tarkwa. By shifting the focus to the city of Tarkwa and the type of interventions 
that are enacted there, it can be found out how abovementioned discussions about the 
construction of (il)legality and the role of the government in this process play out in the local 
urban context.  
One needs to take into account that there is not solely one governmental actor involved 
in actions such as discouraging, obstructing or stopping unregistered small-scale mining. 
Additionally, as Blundo and Le Meur (2008) state, different governmental actors can play 
different, sometimes even opposing, roles in enacting the same policy, which is in this case 
stopping unregistered small-scale mining. Here, it is interesting to look at different logics and 
reasons for certain behavior and how these different governmental actors interact. As this 
research is based on fieldwork conducted in Tarkwa on views from workers in Tarkwa, I will 
discuss the main governmental authorities influencing the small-scale miners, which were 
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mentioned in the stories of the miners. These are the district office of the Minerals 
Commission, law enforcement and the chief.  
 
4.3.1 The District Office of the Minerals Commission in Tarkwa 
Tasks and reality 
Firstly it is interesting to look at the lawful duties of the Minerals Commission and its purpose 
when it comes to small-scale mining. In the Minerals Commission Act of 1993, the Minerals 
Commission was established as a regulatory body under the auspices of the Ministry of Lands 
and Natural Resources. The main function of the Minerals Commission is “the regulation and 
management of the utilization of the mineral resources of Ghana” (Minerals Commission, 
2006). In this function statement of the Minerals Commission, the word ‘utilization’ is one 
that stands out. The focus on utilization of the minerals becomes additionally clear in the 
vision of the Minerals Commission. On the site of Ghana’s Mining Portal the vision of the 
Minerals Commission is described as “the main promotional and regulatory body for the 
minerals sector in Ghana” (Ghana Mining Portal, 2017).  
The Minerals Commission per se is not included in this research, as this level of 
government does not have direct involvement with small-scale miners in Tarkwa. The 
Minerals Commission however has seven ‘district offices’ aimed at supporting registered 
small-scale mining operations, of which one is based in Tarkwa. The functions of the district 
office of the Commission are as following: “ (a) compile a register of small-scale miners and 
prospective small scale miners specifying particulars that may be determined by the Minister; 
(b) supervise and monitor the operations and activities of the small scale miners and 
prospective small scale miners; (c) advise and provide training facilities and assistance 
necessary for effective and efficient small scale mining operations, (d) submit to the 
Commission in a form and at intervals directed by the Commission, reports or other 
documents and information on small scale mining activities within the District; and (e) 
facilitate the formation of Small Scale Miners Association” (Minerals Commission, 2006).  
In the three meetings I had with the district officer - which is the highest official - of 
the district office in Tarkwa, the officer stated that they were involved in different types of 
activities when it comes to registered small-scale mining, amongst others organizing 
stakeholder meetings. Stakeholder meetings are organized every few months for chiefs, 
(prospective) miners and relevant government actors such as the inspectorate division of the 
Minerals Commission, in charge of overseeing large-scale mining companies, to talk about 
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the problems these various actors face. Secondly, when workers on unregistered sites are 
caught working on the concession of a large-scale mining operation, the district office enables 
a dialogue between the chief of the community involved and the large-scale mining operation, 
with cooperation of the inspectorate division of the Minerals Commission.  
The district officer told me the district office carries out bi-monthly visits to registered 
small-scale mining sites, which serve the purpose of checking the mining sites on amongst 
others safety and environmental practices. Initially, the district officer of Tarkwa told me he 
was able to take me on one of his visits. However, as soon as I wanted to plan this, the 
officer’s car broke down which obstructed him from visiting the sites, or so he told me. 
Additionally, he made a lot of visits to Accra, which also kept me from going with him on 
visits to the mining sites. I am very much aware of the fact that this might well be a polite way 
of keeping the visits off, as he was not interested in taking me on these visits. However, when 
asking around on registered small-scale mining sites about the district office of the Minerals 
Commission and their visits, they were very vague about the last visit of the district office and 
the next time this would happen. As such, it is questionable whether the district office visits 
these mining sites bi-monthly. Besides the fact that in practice I have not seen or heard of 
these visits, other supportive practices undertaken by the district office that are well 
documented in the literature and were voiced when talking to the district officer, were not 
voiced during talks with workers of registered sites and the overseers. Therefore, it is 
questionable how frequent and existent these practices are. This story exemplifies the 
insignificant role local law implementers have in supporting registered operations.  
 
The perspective on (il)legality and actions taken 
The district office additionally monitors registered small-scale mining sites, whereby they 
appear to be focusing on water issues. This can be illustrated by the story of one informant 
working on a washing site in Tarkwa, who noted that the district officer came to the washing 
site to monitor the activities once. The informant said that the district office officials saw that 
there is a water management system in place at the washing site, by which they reuse water 
without losing water into the river and as such the river is not spoilt. The informant stated that 
“they know we use water in a good way”. As such, the informant explained that the district 
office allowed the activities taking place and they did not visit the washing site again. 
However, it is of importance to note here that I am not fully aware of the legal status of these 
small-scale washing sites, as the process of washing ore is not formally registered or 
unregistered, with the formalization policy focusing on the presence of a license to mine the 
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subsoil. However, the illustration is striking, as it shows how the district office focuses on 
water issues to a large extent when distinguishing registered and unregistered activities. 
These mentioned activities focus both on prevention of unregistered small-scale 
mining and supporting registered small-scale mining. However, it is striking that unregistered 
small-scale mining activities are not mentioned in the mission and function statement of both 
the district offices and the Minerals Commission as an activity that needs to be prevented or 
that needs to be acted upon. The aim of the district office seems mostly focused on supporting 
already registered small-scale mining operations. The disregard of the presence of 
unregistered small-scale mining is something that is clear from the talks I had with the district 
officer of Tarkwa. Whenever the topic of prevention of unregistered mining practices was 
discussed, the district officer kept on referring to alluvial unregistered small-scale mining 
activities. As such, the district officer mentioned the district office’s activities concerning 
alluvial practices, such as helping to set up meetings with chiefs and the local community to 
provide information on the risks of doing unregistered alluvial small-scale mining. Questions 
regarding actions taken against unregistered underground shaft mining - a practice that is very 
common in the urban area of Tarkwa as opposed to alluvial mining - were not met by clear 
answers.  
Additionally, in one meeting I was trying to find out exactly which of the mining sites 
I visited were registered or not. The district officer had named some of the registered 
operations in the urban area of Tarkwa. Therefore, I asked him about names of certain mining 
sites that I had visited but of which I was not sure whether these were registered or 
unregistered. The question about a certain underground mining operation in a prominent place 
in Tarkwa was met first of all with uncertainty, as if he had never heard of the place. The 
officer answered my question irritatingly with “how would I know of that place”. However, 
gradually he also made responses that made me aware of the legal status of the place. It 
became clear that these sites were in fact not registered and his slight irritation was caused by 
the fact that I was pointing out sites that were indeed not registered.  
However, as noted, the unregistered sites were omnipresent in the town, something 
that was also noted by a university professor who was one of my informants. An illustration 
of the commonness of the places in Tarkwa is the fact that when I asked the professor about 
unregistered mining operations in Tarkwa, he could immediately point out the big 
unregistered operations, and he explained that authorities know of these places but are 
refusing to acknowledge their existence. Although it remains unclear as to exactly why the 
district officer essentially tried to deny the existence of unregistered small-scale mining sites 
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in Tarkwa, it is exemplary of how governmental actors lack the tools - and possibly the 
interest - to stand up to unregistered practices. One plausible reason for this was expressed by 
the professor, when he said that corruption in low positions is a big problem in Ghana. People 
who should be in charge of enforcing the law can often not be trusted with this task, as will be 
elaborated on in the following paragraph on law enforcement.  
  
4.3.2 Law enforcement 
Looking beyond the discrepant definitions miners and both national and regional government 
officials give to legality and illegality, it is a given that unregistered small-scale mining 
operations are ubiquitous in the urban mining town of Tarkwa. Therefore, it is interesting to 
look at governmental authorities with the task of stopping unregistered small-scale mining 
operations. As the Minerals Commission and its district offices do not seem to pay high 
regards to the presence of unregistered small-scale mining operations in the town, there are 
other authorities focused on this task, which are bundled here and termed as law enforcement. 
It is again of importance to realize that there is not one governmental actor involved in law 
enforcement but that there are multiple agencies, organizations and individuals involved in 
this. Security forces such as police, the army, fire services, the security council in the districts 
and the bureau of national investigation all play a part when it comes to halting unregistered 
small-scale mining.  
 
The focus of law enforcement on alluvial mining 
When it comes to law enforcement on unregistered small-scale mining operations, a clear 
division should be made between action taken against alluvial small-scale mining and other 
small-scale mining practices. As follows from the stories of the miners in this research, 
actions by law enforcement are mostly undertaken against unregistered alluvial mining - 
which can be explained due to the destructive nature of alluvial mining. 
Additionally, it is necessary to make the distinction between the urban area of Tarkwa 
and rural or peri-urban areas. Peri-urban areas refers here to “a zone or area where urban and 
rural development processes meet, mix and inter-react on the edge of the cities” (Nottingham 
and Liverpool Universities, 1999, p. 5). When asking informants working and living in 
Tarkwa about police interference with their activities, they would always refer to stories of 
other miners or of their past, which related to rural or peri-urban areas. This, together with the 
fact that actions by law enforcement are mostly undertaken against unregistered alluvial 
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mining - with alluvial mining activities not being practiced widely in Tarkwa - makes for a 
strong consideration that police intervention within the urban area of Tarkwa is not common 
or not present at this time.  
A surprising and related discovery is the fact that when hearing these stories about law 
enforcement, it became clear that it is mostly not the government who sends police forces to 
unregistered mining sites, but this action is sparked by large-scale mining operations. It has 
been noted that “intense dispute” (G. Hilson, 2002b, p. 149) can follow the encroachment of 
unregistered small-scale miners on the land plots of large-scale mining companies. This is in 
line with information obtained in this research on the peri-urban area around Tarkwa, of 
which Abosso is one mining center with a lot of unregistered underground small-scale mining 
activities taking place. One informant in Abosso mentioned that law enforcement does not 
check up on the mining community of Abosso, as the government is mostly attacking alluvial 
mining. Therefore, he said “there is no reason for the government to interfere”. The only actor 
that disturbs this unregistered underground small-scale mining community is the large-scale 
company Gold Fields, who owns the concession to mine the subsoil from which workers in 
Abosso retrieve their ore. The informant from Abosso mentioned that army soldiers, who are 
often hired by the large-scale mining company, can seize technical equipment from the 
workers on unregistered sites in order for small-scale miners to be unable to continue the 
mining activities. The informant remembered only one incident where equipment was seized 
on a big scale in Abosso. Eventually, the community bribed the soldiers that were sent to the 
community, in order to re-commence the mining activities.  
Another peri-urban mining community where some of my informants worked is a 
mining community called Nsadwoso. This is a mining community in the forests that I have 
not visited. However, I have encountered many people who worked in Nsadwoso, while they 
were processing their ore on a washing site in Tarkwa. From these informants I have also 
understood that most trouble with policing authorities is caused by the large-scale company 
Gold Fields sending soldiers to the mining community, as the community is mining on the 
concession of Gold Fields.  
 
Problems with enforcing the law 
The problematic task of law enforcement to structurally stop unregistered small-scale mining 
activities was exemplified, amongst others, by an employee of the Ghana Water Company 
Limited, the state owned Ghanaian water provider. The employee took me on a one-day visit 
to the water treatment plant of Bonsa, which provides the area with clean drinking water, 
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amongst others in Tarkwa. The employee said that workers at the plant report on unregistered 
alluvial mining activities on the river Bonsa to policing authorities. He stated they had a good 
link to the policing authorities, ensuring that a lot of these unregistered mining operations will 
be sent to court. However, he also mentioned the persistent nature of these unregistered 
mining operations, with operations reappearing time after time at the Bonsa River. 
There is attention here to one important complicating factor, namely the profitability 
of unregistered small-scale mining and the way in which this complicates the work of law 
enforcement. Many miners during the research have raised concerns when it comes to the 
prosecution or punishment of workers on unregistered sites that have been caught. Most 
miners do not believe the court to be deterrent enough. When workers of an unregistered 
small-scale mining operation are caught, they are likely to be able to fund the comeback of the 
company, as they are generally running a profitable operation. As such, one informant told the 
story of an unregistered small-scale mining operation he knew of which was convicted to pay 
a certain fee, which equaled the amount of earning of that operation of a day. Additionally, 
there is a general belief by miners that judges can be paid off, in order for workers on 
unregistered sites to be let off with a generally low fine.  
This is the case whenever small-scale mining operations are caught and sent to trial. 
However, small-scale mining operations additionally have ways of working together with law 
enforcement in order to avoid getting caught. Many informants told stories about law 
enforcement working together with miners, whereby law enforcing actors will let the miners 
know when a raid will be taking place. This allows miners to disappear for a while, by either 
moving their operations - in case of alluvial mining - or cease the work temporarily. In this 
case, whenever the police will check up on these operations, there will be no one there which 
makes it impossible for law enforcing authorities to make an arrest. The university professor, 
along with most of the other informants that have voiced their opinions regarding this topic, 
have expressed that they feel the problem does not have to do with the high officials within 
the national government, but especially with corruption in low positions, such as the people 
entrusted with checking and policing unregistered small-scale mining sites. The relative 
wealth of unregistered small-scale mining operations causes these unregistered operations to 
be able to pay law enforcement in exchange for these measures, ensuring them their ability to 
continue their unregistered small-scale mining activities. Thereby, it is exemplified how 
governmental actors lack the tools (and interest) to stand up to illegal practices. 
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4.3.3 Chiefs 
Besides the involved state actors that are mentioned - in this research represented by the 
district office in Tarkwa and law enforcement - in Ghana there is another important group of 
actors with great influence when it comes to governance of the mining sector. These are the 
traditional authorities, or the chiefs. However, it is of importance to note that the state - in the 
Minerals and Mining Act - does not formally acknowledge the role of non-state authorities, 
such as chiefs (Minerals Commission, 2006). During my time in Tarkwa, I have been in 
contact with one chief of the community of Boboobo. The small-scale mining activities in 
Boboobo are unregistered, as the concession belongs to the registered large-scale mining 
company Gold Fields. However, the small-scale mining activities are taking place in between 
two communities. Therefore, the chief explained that there is no space for Gold Fields to 
conduct their mining activities there, as the large-scale company requires a lot of space for 
their surface mining practices.  
 
The facilitating role of the chief  
Chiefs play a role in the small-scale mining sector when it comes to, amongst others, 
facilitating co-habitation plans. Hereby, chiefs present the wishes of the community of small-
scale miners with large-scale mining companies, to allow small-scale mining activities to take 
place on the plots of land of large-scale mining companies, thereby ensuring job availability 
and reducing disputes between these groups (G. Hilson, 2002b). Ubink has argued that, by 
voicing the needs of the communities chiefs can assert local autonomy “against the 
globalizing and modernizing power of the state” (2007, p. 127).  
The insights of Blundo and Le Meur (2008) are striking in the role the chief of 
Boboobo plays. Blundo and Le Meur (2008) state that different levels and actors of 
government act according to different logics, which is helpful in regarding the relationship 
between state governmental actors and traditional authorities. In this case - as showed above - 
governmental actors are mostly focused on establishing registered small-scale mining sites, 
whereas the chief of this community is invested in acquiring job possibilities and 
opportunities for his community. This relates to the role of the chief as being the link between 
governmental actors and the inhabitants in the community. However, it is interesting to note 
that it is highly unlikely that this actual mediation role was taken up by the chief. He 
expressed the process of enabling miners to do the work, as the government should provide 
this opportunity of generating income. However, the mining site in this community was in 
fact not registered, which means that this process has not taken place or has failed. This shows 
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that there is indeed a sign of an opposing relationship between the state and the traditional 
authority (Blundo & Le Meur, 2008).  
 
The opposing role of the chief 
As Blundo and Le Meur (2008) have stated, the existence of different actors in the public 
sphere can cause differences in the production of rules, which is the case here. The chief - 
being an important mode of authority in the community - has the opinion that workers should 
be able to work in the designated mining area in the community, as Gold Fields will not work 
there, and “they will never work there”. However, this is not in accordance with state rules, 
causing differences in the production of rules, which consequently causes uncertainties to the 
mining community. One of the important effects of the involvement of different authorities in 
this research therefore is that this seems to be contributing to the discrepancy of definitions of 
(il)legality amongst miners.  
As such, the chief explained that a lot of his people are not able to find a job in another 
sector. The chief believes that whenever these people do not have a job they will resort to 
other ways of making money, such as stealing. The chief therefore allows people to do mining 
work as the area is “suitable” to conduct mining activities, in the words of the chief. By 
suitable here he explained that he refers to the fact that the mining activities should not take 
place on the river, as this causes water pollution. The views of the chief seem to correlate with 
those of the miners and government officials, all distinguishing between illegal and licit 
actions on the basis of morality.  
During conversations with the chief one thing was clear: the current governments’ aim 
to stop illegal small-scale mining (Brako-Powers, 2017b) is described as a mission impossible. 
As such, the chief, together with his spokesperson, laughed when I brought up this 
pronounced goal. He said “they will overthrow the government. Sorry for him, but the 
government cannot stop the galamsey”. This is a most interesting remark, especially whilst  
taking into account the following remark of Ubink (2007). Ubink (2007) argues that chiefs are 
in the position to implement laws and policy from the national government and are at the 
same time the transmitter of the wishes and views from the community to the governmental 
actors. However, as we see here, the chief of Boboobo does not seem to create awareness on 
the wishes and views of the community but creates a division between national government 
on the one side, versus practices and traditional authority on the other. The chief seems aware 
of the wishes of the community - namely to have access to income -, but is not able or willing 
to link this up with state actors by means of official co-habitation schemes. 
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This chapter has provided insights into the legal framework enabling the formalization 
process in which mining operations can transition to a legal - thus registered - mining site. 
Subsequently, it became clear that miners are not reliant or expectant of support or benefits 
from government actors. Thereby, government is not viewed as a potential actor which 
provides support or benefits, causing miners not to rely on governmental support in their daily 
mining practices - which is the case both when it comes to registered and unregistered small-
scale mining sites. Finally, we have shown how local governmental actors including the 
district office, chiefs and law enforcement agencies enact the policy of formalization. These 
actions are mostly focused on stopping alluvial small-scale mining, whereby action against 
unregistered underground shaft mining practices even seems to be avoided or neglected in 
Tarkwa.  
Therefore, this chapter has showed how the discrepancy between the lawful definition 
of (il)legality and the definition of (il)legality that miners adhere to is both adhered to and 
caused by governmental actors - both on the national and the local level. These insights can 
help in explaining the discrepant usages of the definition of (il)legality. Namely, these insights 
show how miners rather rely on a moral basis upon constructing (il)legality - especially when 
this discrepancy is also adhered to by various local and national governmental actors - than 
taking into account the legal framework by a government which’s role is generally viewed as 
insignificant. 
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Chapter 5 Differences in practices of miners between registered and 
unregistered mining sites  
After elaborating on the construction and usage of various definitions of (il)legality - 
including the way in which this is both partially adhered to and caused by (local) 
governmental actors, insights will be provided into the practice of the policy of formalization 
and the corresponding effects this policy has on the work of miners. Therefore, I will go 
through the main stages of the small-scale gold mining process in this chapter. In all these 
stages I will distinguish between practices on registered and unregistered sites. The first step 
of the mining process is gaining access to the mining site, which enables miners to acquire 
income. Subsequently, respectively process of obtaining ore from the underground, washing 
the ore and selling the gold will be discussed.  
First of all it is interesting to reflect on my personal expectations of visiting both 
registered and unregistered small-scale mining sites. I expected to be able to clearly view the 
difference between registered and unregistered sites, amongst others due to the fact that in the 
literature government support for registered operations is focused on (G. Hilson, 2001). As 
such, I expected to clearly and immediately apprehend the legal status of the site on the basis 
of for instance the technological development or the working conditions. My actual 
experience however was very different. As stated before, it was unclear to me which mining 
sites were in fact registered or unregistered for the longest time of my research period, mostly 
due to the discrepancy between definitions of (il)legality mentioned above, but certainly also 
considering the fact that clear differences in the exterior of small-scale mining sites cannot be 
attributed to the legal status of the small-scale mining operation. This will be elaborated on 
below. 
 
5.1. Access to income: introduction 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) distinguish access to employment as one mechanism which ensures 
access to resources, as a miner gets access to a site of someone who controls access to the 
resource. Emphasizing the term employment however does not do justice to the small-scale 
mining sector, as it suggests an organized and formal relationship with an employer. The 
work that is conducted on small-scale mining sites can mostly be characterized as open-ended 
and non-binding work. As such, here we will speak of access to income generating 
opportunities, henceforth shortly termed as access to income. Providing access to income is 
believed to be one of the main benefits of small-scale mining, amongst others due to the 
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general labor-intensive nature of small-scale mining. One of the main benefits of 
formalization policy is believed to be managing the positive impacts of small-scale mining 
(Salo et al., 2016). Additionally, G. Hilson states that small-scale mining “has a major impact 
on the employment situation in the developing world” (2001, p. 5). Combining insights of G. 
Hilson (2001) and Salo et al. (2016), it could be assumed that registered small-scale mining 
sites provide more or more sustainable access to income.  
Following the dire situation of the job market - with many informants in this research 
expressing the lack of job availability as a pressing issue - the insights of G. Hilson (2001) 
seem to apply in Tarkwa, where mining poses income generating opportunities for many. This 
can be exemplified by a story of one of my informants, a miner working on an unregistered 
small-scale mining site. He is from Kumasi, where his family - including his pregnant wife 
and his children - were still living. He is a trained electrician, however as the company he was 
working at had less work, he was forced to stay at home - sometimes for months at a time. 
This imaginably caused great problems, as he needed to provide for his family. Finally, he felt 
he had no other option than to come to Tarkwa to undertake mining activities. This is one 
particular story from one particular miner. However, I have heard a version of this story from 
at least ten miners. Additionally, the chief of the Boboobo community stated that there would 
be a lot of jobless people in his community, were it not for small-scale mining. These stories 
not only exemplify the difficult Ghanaian job market, but more so the income generating 
opportunities the small-scale mining sector does offer. As such, gaining access to mining is a 
highly important stage in the mining process that will be discussed in more detail here than 
the other mining stages. This will be elaborated on, by focusing on how access is both 
arranged and constrained on registered and unregistered sites. This will provide the insights 
which will lead to the conclusion of this sub-section of access to income, thereby remarking 
on the effect of formalization policy on access to income. 
 
5.1.1 The mechanisms of access to income for miners 
In this paragraph, a general view of access to income for miners will be given. Hereby, I will 
elaborate on both situations of registered and unregistered small-scale mining operations, in 
order to finally make a comparison between access to income on registered and unregistered 
operations. 
Generally, it was clear that access to income is arranged through the social network of 
the miner. Both miners that work at registered and unregistered small-scale sites expressed 
that they were introduced on the mining site by a family member or friend, which enabled 
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them to work on the mining site. As such, in talks with owners of mining sites and washing 
sites, it was clear that they also saw the benefits of attracting workers through current workers 
of the site. Even on the registered small-scale mining site of Mohammed & Co, where the 
Chinese workers present at that site arrange personnel, social contact play the most important 
role in gaining access to income. As such, Chinese informants expressed how they were 
attracting Ghanaian workers by asking for workers through Ghanaians they knew. It can 
therefore be concluded that access to income - both on registered and unregistered small-scale 
mining sites - is very much dependent on the social contacts of the miners.  
 Ribot and Peluso claim that those who own property control the access of others, as 
owners have the rights (2003). As such, owners of the mining site are the ones who control 
access to the resources. This shows how generally owners of mining sites are in a powerful 
position. On most mining sites - both registered and unregistered sites - it is common practice 
and mandatory to give a certain percentage of the obtained ore to the owners of the site, in 
exchange for the owners arranging amongst others technical equipment such as water pumps. 
On most mining sites this percentage ranged from one-third to half of the obtained ore. In this 
way the notion of access and property helps us in clarifying who handles and controls access, 
whilst others are dependent on gaining access through those who have control. As such, 
owners of mining sites can decide upon the need to have more workers on the sites, thereby 
bringing in more people and enabling access to income for these miners. 
It has to be noted here that there are solely men doing the underground work. During 
the fieldwork I have entered underground shafts on multiple occasions. I have however also 
encountered 3 situations in which I was not allowed to enter on the basis of my sex, as no 
females were allowed to enter. This involves two underground shafts but also the entire 
mining community Nsadwoso, where women were not allowed at all.  Although I was unable 
to get clear answers as to the reason for this prohibition, this seemed to be associated with 
ancient beliefs. As such, Addei and Amankwah found that women in their period are often not 
allowed to enter pits “for the fear that the gods seeing an ‘unclean’ person will withdraw the 
gold which is believed to belong to the gods” (2011, p. 249). Besides that, other mining 
activities such as crushing and washing the ore in Tarkwa are also predominantly conducted 
by men. During the fieldwork, I have only seen women active in the mining process on 3 
occasions. All of these times, women were employed in order to carry the stones from the 
entrance of the underground shaft to the washing sites. As such, access to income on mining 
sites is predominantly obtainable to men. 
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 When it comes to the underground work, this can be easily explained, and has to do 
with the one prerequisite that is in place in order to gain access to income - both on registered 
and on unregistered sites: having the own physical strength that is needed in order to conduct 
the heavy underground mining activities. As such, when asking what was needed in order to 
conduct the underground work, one miner just said: “you have to be strong”.  Here, the miners 
refer solely to physical strength, not making any mention of mental strength to be a 
prerequisite. Some miners expressed the need to be able to control one’s fears whilst 
conducting the underground work. Some miners smoked weed or used other sorts of drugs to 
be able to do the work. With physical strength being the only prerequisite to conduct the work, 
gaining access to income on a mining site is therefore generally possible for most men. 
However, several of the workers on washing sites expressed that they initially did 
underground work, as this usually generates more income, but soon learned themselves they 
did not have the strength to do the work. Therefore they resorted to a job operating machines 
on washing sites.  
Lastly, the formal prerequisites on registered small-scale mining sites need to be taken 
into account here. The registered site Stejoan reportedly used to have a system in place in 
which miners were required to have insurance and needed to be registered as a worker at the 
site, by means of getting a tag. This meant that their picture was taken, after which they 
received a tag which they would have to show when entering the shaft. This ensured the 
company to know who entered the shaft and check if everybody had come back up at the end 
of the day. Stejoan had been experiencing trouble for the last 1,5 years due to the flooding of 
the shafts. Therefore, this system was not in place during the time of the research.  
My informant - an overseer and part of the family who owned the concession - at the 
registered mining site Mohammed & Co was planning on putting a similar system in place, 
including insurance, tags and even the provisioning of a pension, which would be deducted 
from the salary. As for now this system was not in place at both registered small-scale mining 
sites. Therefore, these reported plans cannot be taken into account as real prerequisites for 
miners to gain access to income.  
 
5.1.2 Constrained access to income for miners 
Focusing on access as an ability to benefit “brings attention to a wider range of social 
relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from resources” (2003, p. 154). 
There are various problems that obstruct miners in their access to conduct work on small-
scale mining sites. The problems that occurred most frequently in Tarkwa were caused by 
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natural processes, the mismanagement of the site or the introduction of increasing levels of 
technology. As such it will be shown again how certain groups or people handle and control 
access, whereas others need to depend on gaining access through those who control it (Ribot 
& Peluso, 2003).  
 
Natural processes and the mismanagement of the site 
Interestingly, some factors constraining access are not directly caused by people or groups of 
people, but initially by natural processes. Here, I refer to problems with water obstructing 
access to underground shafts. This will be exemplified by two stories, one of a registered and 
one of an unregistered small-scale mining site. An overseer of an unregistered site in Abosso - 
the peri-urban mining community just outside of Tarkwa - told the story of a time the water 
was rising so high in the underground shafts it obstructed miners to conduct underground 
mining activities. Water rising in the shafts is common - due to the fact that underground 
mining activities also take place below the water table -, but he explained how power relations 
caused this problem to arise. Normally, there was an agreement with a contractor, who pumps 
out the water which enables miners to do the underground work. However the contractor was 
aware of the powerful position he was in - as ceasing his work irrevocably meant the inability 
to work for the community - and therefore demanded more money for his pumping services. 
The community was headstrong and refused to pay him anymore, therefore causing a situation 
in which the water kept on rising, making it unable for workers to enter the shafts. As such, 
we see that the process of access is a dynamic one with certain people and institutions 
handling and controlling access - in this case the water pump contractor - and others being 
dependent on gaining access through those who are in control.  
Secondly, access to work on the registered small-scale mining site Stejoan proved to 
be restricted due to mismanagement of the mining site. As has been explained, the owners of 
the site had been unable to pay the electricity bill, causing water to rise, as the water pumps 
could not run. This led to a shutdown of the operation for about 1,5 years. As such, one 
informant working at Stejoan expressed that this inability to work at the mining site was the 
moment for him to go back to school to further his education with the money he had been 
saving up from mining. Both situations are initially caused by the natural process of rising 
water, but eventually lead to someone or groups of people handling and controlling access, 
and other people being constrained from gaining access.  
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Increased levels of technology: the case of Mohammed & Co 
Another - more permanent - obstruction of access to income can be caused by the introduction 
of more or heavier machinery on a small-scale mining site. This will be exemplified by the 
activities taking place on the registered small-scale mining site Mohammed & Co. 
Mohammed & Co had hired Chinese contractors who brought in Chinese technical equipment. 
As has been explained in section 4.2.3, the company Mohammed & Co consists of two parts, 
namely the Chinese part and the galamsey part of the company. The technical equipment is 
solely available for the Chinese part of the company, with the galamsey part of the company 
not being allowed to work with the Chinese equipment.  
In the Chinese part of the company the technical equipment performs the tasks that are 
otherwise performed by manual labor. This is exemplified by picture 1, which portrays the 
work of respectively the galamsey part of the company and the Chinese part of the company. 
During one morning at Mohammed & Co, I observed two men. First of all there was a man - 
being part of the galamsey part of the company - carrying sacks of ore on his back to the place 
where the ore would be washed. At the same time there was a man driving on a mechanized 
tricycle - of the Chinese part of the company - that would transport a lot more ore per trip. 
Additionally, for every time the man who carried the ore walked by, the man on the tricycle 
would have already made at least 3 trips to the washing place.    
Interestingly, Ribot and Peluso (2003) acknowledge access to technology as one 
mechanism of gaining access to resources. However, in this case the introduction of 
technology by owners of the site - who handle and control access - will constrain access to 
income for miners. This is exemplified by the pictures, showing how many more men are 
needed to get the ore to the washing site in the galamsey part of the company. The company 
therefore still employs plenty of Ghanaian workers, however mostly in the galamsey part of 
the company.  
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Picture 1: Miners working on the registered small-scale mining site Mohammed & Co. Left portrays 
the work of a miner in the galamsey part of the company; right shows the technologically developed 
work the Chinese part of the company conducts. Pictures taken by author.  
 
5.1.3 The effect of formalization policy on access to income 
After providing a general view of access - and constraining factors - to income on both 
registered and unregistered mining sites, here we take another look at formalization policy 
and how formalization influences access to income. Salo et al. argue that formalization policy 
enables governments to govern the sector in a better way, which thereby amongst others are 
better able to manage the sector’s positive impacts (2016). Providing access to income is 
described as one of the sector’s positive impacts, which would therefore be able to be 
managed in a better way, following Salo et al. (2016). Clear differences in the case of access 
to income for miners either on registered or unregistered sites in Tarkwa have however not 
been noticed during the fieldwork. The mechanisms for providing access to income for miners 
are similar, as social contacts seem to play a vital role.  
Additionally, it is interesting to look at the factors that constrain access to income. We 
have identified the factors constraining access in Tarkwa as problems caused by natural 
processes, the mismanagement of the site and the introduction of increased levels of 
technology. There is however no evidence that these factors are less prevalent on registered 
sites. As such, problems with the site management - and particularly those resulting in 
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electricity cuts - seem to occur both at registered and unregistered sites, compelling some 
miners to wait for the site to resolve its issues. Even more so: access seems to be constrained 
on the registered site of Mohammed & Co. It seems that in the future access to income on this 
registered site will be limited by increasingly mechanizing the operation, therefore making 
labor forces to a certain extent abundant.  
Finally, in trying to find out what effects formalization policy has on the access to 
income on registered and unregistered sites in Tarkwa, it is interesting to take into account the 
dilemma of the informal sector. The dilemma of the informal sector - formulated by the 
International Labour Organization ILO - makes for an interesting theory, as it questions if the 
informal sector should in fact be promoted for ensuring access to income, or if there is a need 
for increased regulation and protection which might cause the work-capacity to reduce 
(Hansen & Vaa, 2004).  
As registered small-scale mining sites are required to go through the entire process of 
obtaining for a license, it is a logical assumption that there might also be more funding 
available to ensure a certain standard of mechanization. As we have seen in the case of 
Mohammed & Co this might result in a reduced necessity of physical labor on registered 
small-scale mining sites. The differences between handling or controlling access versus being 
dependent on others who control access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) becomes yet again clear from 
the case of Mohammed & Co. Owners of registered sites may be in the position to own more 
property - such as technical equipment. The power to restrict access to income for miners on 
registered mining sites is therefore also increasingly high, as the work of these miners can 
become unnecessary or redundant by the introduction of (more) machinery. It goes too far to 
conclude from the single case of Mohammed & Co that registered small-scale mining sites in 
general reduce its workforce in favor of technological development. However, the research 
does show that it is incorrect to assume and emphasize formalization policy to have a positive 
impact on income opportunities as such.  
As becomes clear from the research: there are no clear differences regarding access to 
income that are caused by the legal status of the small-scale mining sites in Tarkwa. This is 
the case first of all regarding access to income, which is obtained mainly through social 
contacts. Additionally, this is also the case for factors constraining access to income, which 
are caused by natural processes, the mismanagement of the site and the introduction of 
increasing levels of technology. Therefore, to state that formalization enables governments to 
better manage the positive impacts of the sector - one of which is the access to income it 
provides - goes too far. There is even some precarious evidence suggesting that formalization 
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of sites might reduce the necessity of physical labor on small-scale mining sites, in line with 
the dilemma of the informal sector.  
 
5.2 Obtaining the ore: safety measures 
After elaborating on factors concerning access to income, I will hereby focus on the 
subsequent stage in the mining process: obtaining the ore. Hereby, I will focus on 
underground shaft mining activities as most of the informants in this research conducted 
underground mining work. Shaft mining is considered to be very dangerous work due to the 
possibility of collapse of the shafts. During my fieldwork, I often heard recent stories of 
miners being killed by a collapse and have even visited the funeral of a miner who died from 
a collapse. Therefore, formalization policy would serve its purpose of minimizing negative 
consequences when it is clear that these dangers are reduced or eliminated on registered 
small-scale mining sites. There seem to be no clear rules regarding the underground work 
both on registered and unregistered small-scale mining sites, with the exception of one 
registered site. The miners at Stejoan were prohibited to go down the shafts alone, as this 
posed a big risk. However, in practice all the miners I had talked to went down in groups of at 
least two, which mostly had to do with the dangers that are associated with the work. All the 
miners I talked to, including miners on both registered and unregistered sites, were very aware 
of the dangers the underground mining work posed, which is logical to explain with deaths 
taking place so often.  
The overseers at registered small-scale mining sites stated that the registered sites are 
in fact a lot less dangerous. The overseers attributed this to the fact that the district office 
comes to check up on these registered sites and enforces these sites to ensure safety measures, 
such as putting in place boulders to ensure stability. Additionally, registered small-scale 
mining sites are required to report on casualties to the authorities. However, I wondered how 
workers on registered sites who actually go down into the shafts themselves regarded the 
issue of safety, and if they indeed felt more safe working on a registered site. When asking 
them about the benefits of working on a registered small-scale mining site, mostly however 
they did not point to the benefits regarding safety. Even more so: they often would not know 
what to say.  
 Rather, I found that miners have their own way of enhancing their physical safety in 
the absence of formal means: this is related to the familiarity with the underground shafts. 
This is illustrated by the story of the miners at Stejoan. I wanted to find out why miners 
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working at Stejoan still stayed at this operation given the problems the company was facing, 
rendering it impossible for them to work at full capacity. To illustrate the negative 
consequences: this meant that the miners were not able to reach the underground levels which 
contained most of the gold. This led miners to settle for places that contained less gold, 
thereby in the end making less money. After asking this question, it became clear to me that 
the motivation to keep working at this site did not have to do with benefits due to the legal 
status of the mining site at all. The familiarity with the place underground was a great factor 
here, as miners were conscious of the dangers that could arise underground, and felt safe in 
this place that they knew. One miner in Abosso expressed that he had been unable to mine for 
more than a year due to the water obstruction. However, he did not search for another mining 
site where he could conduct his mining activities. As such, one of the informants even said 
straight up that there were no benefits for him to be working at a registered site, but his 
allegiance to this site was first and foremost due to the familiarity of the underground. 
Additionally, both workers on registered and unregistered sites emphasized that the dangers of 
the work all depend on the worker who does the work, instead of the legal status with its 
possible check-ups by the government. The workers were aware of the dangers of the work, 
but felt confident that they were well trained and experienced enough to avoid any accidents. 
In sum, overseers at registered sites feel confident that the legal status of the registered 
site enhances the level of safety for the work that is to be done underground. However, it 
became clear that miners rely on their own familiarity with the underground which provides 
them with a sense of security, whilst they do not express to feel safer due to the fact that the 
site is registered.  
 
5.3 Washing the ore: restricted negotiating power 
After obtaining the ore from the ground, the miners bring the ore to washing sites, to grind 
and wash their load in order for them to obtain the desired gold particles. As stated, the issue 
of (il)legality is based on subtracting minerals from the subsoil and does therefore not revolve 
around the washing site. Therefore, the legal status of the washing sites remains fairly unclear. 
However, the differences between registered and unregistered small-scale mining practices 
regarding the washing stage can still be reviewed. Namely, I found that workers on 
unregistered small-scale sites were generally free to bring their ore to any washing site of their 
choosing, whereas miners working on a registered concession were obliged to bring their ore 
to a specific designated washing site.  
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During the research I was puzzled by the many washing sites in Tarkwa and tried to 
find out the different reasons for miners to go to specific washing sites, as most miners 
seemed to have clear preferences of the place where they took their ore. This was clear as 
most miners always came back to the same washing site. As time went by, I learned how the 
process of bringing the ore to a certain washing site is underlined by multiple factors. As such, 
washing sites may for example offer to pay for transportation of the load or offer special 
prices for the use of the equipment that is needed for crushing the ore. In addition, washing 
site owners can also make agreements about sharing the income of the so called tailings of the 
mining process with the miners. The tailings are made up of the crushed ore that is left after 
the washing process, as small-scale miners are unable to take out all the gold particles 
employing their techniques. It is believed that those tailings still contain 70% of the total 
amount of gold in the ore, meaning that small-scale miners can only take out 30% of the gold. 
These tailings remain at the washing site until they are bought up by large-scale companies 
who can extract most of the gold by using certain chemicals. As the tailings contain such high 
amounts of gold, washing site owners are generally able to ask high prices for these tailings. 
Miners can therefore make agreements with the washing site owner to obtain a share of the 
profit of the sale of tailings. During talks to owners of washing sites, they explained their 
dependency on “customers” - which are in this case miners - for bringing the load to their 
washing site. This dependency puts miners in a beneficial position, who are therefore able to 
make price agreements and negotiate a good deal for themselves. However, as said this 
benefit was in place solely for workers on unregistered sites, as workers on registered sites 
were initially obliged to take their ore to designated washing sites.  
The main reason for registered small-scale mining sites to oblige the workers to bring 
the ore to a pre-specified washing site also revolves around the acquirement of the tailings. By 
compelling workers to bring the ore to their washing site, the owners of the registered small-
scale mining site make sure they acquire as many tailings as they can. The owners 
subsequently gain as much as they can from the collection and finally the sale of these tailings. 
The workers on registered small-scale sites I have talked to seemed unhappy with these pre-
specified washing sites. This is best exemplified by the fact that several miners talked to me 
about ways they could bypass this rule and bring the ore to a place of their own choosing. 
They would for instance pay the guards at the mining site to be able to transport the ore 
themselves. The obligation for miners on a registered site of bringing the ore to a designated 
washing site, thereby restricting the negotiating power of miners on registered sites, highly 
relates to the corresponding obligation in the next mining process, namely the sale of gold. 
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5.4 The sale of gold: restricted negotiating power 
After small-scale miners have gone through all the above mentioned stages, they receive 
money from the sale of the gold they have obtained. Whilst conducting the research it became 
clear that small-scale miners on unregistered sites are mostly free to sell their gold to 
whomever they may choose. On the two registered sites that are part of this research, the 
small-scale miners were obliged to sell the gold back to the company who owns the 
concession and who buys the gold from the miners for a lower price than the market price. 
This enables the company to make profit on the sale of gold, as they are able to sell it for a 
higher price to the market. This does not mean that workers on unregistered sites always get a 
better price for the gold they are selling: they are also subject to the whims of gold buyers and 
the amount of money buyers are willing to pay. However, in practice it does mean that miners 
working on a registered site are restricted to sell their gold to the company, whereas workers 
on registered sites were able to sell to whomever they chose. Therefore, miners working on 
unregistered small-scale mining sites are initially in a better position to establish a good price 
for the gold.  
One might think that it is more difficult for miners of unregistered small-scale mining 
sites to sell their gold, as gold buyers would want to buy gold that was obtained from a 
registered mining site. However, as becomes clear from an informant who is a gold buyer, in 
practice gold buyers do not seem to mind if they buy gold from a miner working on a 
registered or on an unregistered site. The informant was a registered gold buyer, which means 
he was required to pay taxes once a year. When I asked him if he would buy gold only from 
workers on registered sites, he looked at me strangely and I felt he almost had to laugh. He 
remarked that he would buy gold from anyone that he trusted or feel he could trust. The 
precondition of trust which he states here has two reasons, the first being the fact that there 
are a number of small-scale miners skilled in forging gold, thereby selling something that 
looks exactly like gold to most. The gold buyer explained that he was skilled in detecting this 
forgery, however this forgery still posed a risk for him.  
Secondly, gold buyers often give out loans for small-scale miners who are in the 
process of obtaining the gold but are not finished with the whole process yet, therefore 
making it impossible for them to sell gold at that moment. Going through the whole process 
of obtaining gold for miners can take different amount of days, ranging from just a few days 
to a few months. Miners decide themselves and among the people they work with how often 
they want to wash their gold. Some miners choose to go underground only one or a few days, 
after which they wash the ore and are able to sell the gold to the buyer. However, some 
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miners decide to go underground for a few weeks, after which they wash the ore. This enables 
them to sell gold only once every month or few weeks. In the latter case the miners are able to 
save up their ore, which leads them to obtain more gold for the moment they sell their gold. 
Especially in these cases, gold buyers will give out chop-money to the miners. This is money 
miners use to buy food during the periods when they are not able to sell gold yet. In return, 
the gold buyer ensures the sale of the gold to himself instead of to other buyers, and he mostly 
subtracts this borrowed amount from the next gold deposit he buys from the miners. What this 
illustrates is that gold buyers seem to be fairly careful when selecting who to buy gold from, 
as they are aware of the risks that are attached to their profession. However, even though the 
informant himself was a registered buyer however, he did not care at all about the legal status 
of the miner he bought his gold from. 
In sum, it can be concluded here that miners working on registered small-scale mining 
sites have a restricted negotiating power when it comes choosing whom to sell their obtained 
gold to. This creates a disadvantaged position for miners working on registered small-scale 
mining sites. Additionally, we see how gold buyers do not seem to make a distinction between 
gold that has been obtained from a registered or an unregistered site.  
 
After reviewing the different stages in the small-scale mining process - thereby attempting to 
get a clear view on the benefits of formalization policy of small-scale mining for miners - we 
are left with an ambiguous view. Possible benefits of working at a registered small-scale 
mining site have to do with a possible decreased level of danger when conducting the mining 
activities, a factor that is however not widely acknowledged amongst miners. Moreover, 
miners do not see the supposed benefits regarding safety upon formalization, as they rely on 
their own familiarity with the underground, thereby being responsible for their own safety. 
The research additionally shows that formalization policy does not seem to have a positive 
impact on opportunities regarding access to income. Not only does it become clear that there 
is no difference between gaining access to income on either registered or unregistered sites; it 
appears so that formalization of sites even reduces access to income, as the necessity of 
physical labour on formalized sites is more likely to decrease. Clear disadvantages of 
formalization for small-scale miners have additionally been shown in the process of obtaining 
the ore and selling the gold. This especially has to do with restriction of making own choices 
regarding where to take the ore and where to sell the gold. Following these outcomes, whether 
the policy of formalization is therefore righteously described as the path towards economic 
development (G.  Hilson & Hilson, 2015; McQuilken & Hilson, 2016) - and serves the 
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purpose of managing the positive impacts and minimizing negative impacts of small-scale 
mining - is therefore questionable as it proves unjustified in practice. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusion 
This research focused on the supposed need for formalization of the small-scale mining sector 
as posited by scholars and policy makers. By these actors it is assumed that formalization 
enables governments to govern the sector in a better way, managing the sector’s positive and 
negative impacts, such as respectively social and environmental impacts (Salo et al., 2016). 
However, the high prevalence of unregistered small-scale mining practices up to date sparks 
curiosity as to how formalization policy is perceived by small-scale miners themselves. The 
aim of this research was therefore - by providing a ‘grassroots perspective’ - to obtain more 
insights into the practice of formalization of small-scale mining operations. The research 
illustrates how legality and illegality are definitions that are not definite and absolute but are 
constructed and produced by various actors in the small-scale mining sector.  
One of the main observations in this research is that miners and local law 
implementers, as well as national governmental officials, base the construction of (il)legality 
on the way in which mining practices are conducted. Water pollution and the destruction of 
water bodies is a considerable and emphasized problem, both by national officials, as well as 
Ghanaians that were part of this research. It is clear that these actors first and foremost 
criticize unregistered small-scale mining operations for the harm that is done to water bodies. 
Actors therefore categorize alluvial mining practices as illegal practices, thereby constructing 
the definition of (il)legality on the basis of morality. As such, a clear distinction can be seen in 
what the state formally considers to be legitimate - that which is legal - and what involved 
actors consider to be legitimate - which can be called licit (Abraham & van Schendel, 2005). 
This means that (il)legality in the lawful sense - solely related to the possession of a license to 
mine the minerals in the subsoil - is discrepant to the in practice constructed notion of 
(il)legality, as some miners and law implementers relate illegal practices solely to alluvial 
practices. As such, the term fluid legality has been introduced. This refers to the fact that 
legality is firstly a concept that is not static, but rather fluid. Secondly, it refers to the way in 
which legality is constructed on the basis of morality - titling alluvial practices as illegal. This 
is a valuable insight considering the scholarly and governmental wish to formalize the sector. 
Policy makers should first of all be aware of the discrepant notions of (il)legality in practice, 
to realize that governmental ideas about (il)legality are not mirrored in society. By being 
aware of the discrepancy, policy makers are able to alter their policy and method of 
implementation, to assure that policy reflects practice.  
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This comprehension links up to and adds to knowledge on the production of state 
authority, governance and power. In line with Abraham and van Schendel (2005), Elyachar 
(2002) and Hansen and Vaa (2004) it has become clear that the dominant image of the state 
making up and fighting against illegal activities merely gives a simplistic view of reality. 
Additionally, it has been elaborated that governing power is very much divided over a number 
of governmental actors and agencies, trying to contest and negotiate their own and others’ 
governing power. As such, in this research we have seen how a local actor - in this case the 
chief of a local community - contests and contradicts the legal framework of the government, 
thereby adding to the discrepancy of the notion of (il)legality. Interestingly, we have also seen 
how local governmental actors establish an opposing relationship with the national legislative 
framework, by adhering to the discrepant usage of (il)legality. As such, the research adds to 
the notion of how the nation-state’s sovereignty is highly influenced by global and local, and 
state and non-state authorities.  
Furthermore, this research illustrated how the lack of differences in practices between 
registered and unregistered small-scale mining sites might allow for a high prevalence of 
unregistered small-scale mining sites. We are left with an ambiguous view when it comes to 
the benefits that prevail for miners on registered small-scale mining sites. As such, local 
government officials and overseers at registered mining sites state that there is a possible 
decreased level of danger when it comes to conducting the underground mining activities. 
Interestingly, this is however not voiced by miners themselves, who express that own personal 
strength and experience is the only factor influencing the level of danger that is part of the 
work. However, disadvantages of working on a registered small-scale mining site have in fact 
been identified, mostly relating to the limited negotiating power of miners when it comes to 
the place to respectively wash the ore and sell the gold. As examples of possible benefits and 
disadvantages are given, this should most importantly not be overstated. As such, most small-
scale miners expressed insignificant differences between registered and unregistered small-
scale mining sites. Whether or not the policy of formalization is therefore righteously 
described as the path towards economic development (G.  Hilson & Hilson, 2015; McQuilken 
& Hilson, 2016) is questionable. 
The insignificant difference between registered and unregistered small-scale mining 
operations might be explained by the way in which government actors support registered 
small-scale mining and obstruct unregistered small-scale mining - and which might also allow 
for the high prevalence of unregistered small-scale mining activities. The governmental actors 
included in this research - being the district office of the Minerals Commission in Tarkwa, 
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law enforcement agencies and chiefs - are mostly focused on stopping alluvial small-scale 
mining, of which the practices are very scarce in Tarkwa. As such, it appears that the district 
office and law enforcement agencies mostly deny the existence of or avoid dealing with 
unregistered underground mining practices in Tarkwa. This is exemplary of the lack in tools - 
or possibly interest - of governmental actors to stand up to unregistered practices. 
Additionally, one aspect that is focused on in this research is access to income, with 
access proving to be an important concept, as it describes “the ability to benefit from things" 
(Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 153). As such, income generating opportunities are put forward by 
G. Hilson (2001) as one of the main benefits of small-scale mining, amongst others due to the 
general labor-intensive nature of small-scale mining. However, this research shows that the 
mechanisms of providing access to income are rather similar for registered and unregistered 
sites, with social contacts playing a vital role. The factors that have been identified in 
constraining access to income were caused by natural processes, the mismanagement of the 
site and the introduction of increasing levels of technology. Both registered and unregistered 
small-scale mining sites in this research have shown problems concerning access to income 
due to inadequate site management, with certain mining sites being unable to operate for a 
period of time. There is both no evidence that registered sites are less prone to encounter these 
problematic periods, and that registered sites that encounter problems are more likely to be 
operational sooner due to possible governmental support.  
Following these outcomes, it is not possible to conclude that formalization enables 
governments to better manage the positive impacts of the sector - one of which being 
providing (safer) access to income. On the registered small-scale mining sites that were part 
of this research the presumed advantages of registration did not materialize. Moreover, in one 
case the necessity of physical labor even diminished. This can be explained by the fact that 
owners of the site who are able to go through the costly and timely process of obtaining a 
license, might also be more likely to obtain money or attract investors to mechanize the site - 
thereby reducing the necessity of the amount of physical labor. It goes too far to conclude 
from a single case that registered sites in general reduce its workforce in favor of 
technological development. However, this finding provides precarious evidence which adds 
insights into the dilemma of the informal sector. This dilemma raises the question whether the 
informal sector should “be promoted as a provider of employment and incomes or should 
regulation and social protection be extended to it, thereby possibly reducing its capacity to 
provide jobs and incomes?” (Hansen & Vaa, 2004, p. 16). 
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The notion that the small-scale mining sector is most heterogeneous and can for long not be 
described anymore by the characterizations of low levels of technology and investment, as 
described by Ferring et al. (2016), becomes ever more clear in this research. Another way of 
categorizing small-scale mining operations is by means of differentiating between registered 
and unregistered operations, as has been done in this research. This research however has 
shown how trying to make distinctions between registered and unregistered small-scale 
mining sites are in fact not constructive. This does not mean that the focus on this distinction 
in this research has been ill-advised, on the contrary. It exactly shows how insignificant 
differences in practices on legal and illegal small-scale mining sites are and how this situation 
is mostly sustained by local law implementers. This is a valuable lesson learned, especially 
when realizing that scholars and government emphasize the need for formalization of the 
sector. It is not suggested here that formalization is not to be an aspired course of action. The 
outcome of this research however shows that the benefits of formalization are not static and 
straightforward, but are currently rather insignificant and unsubstantial for small-scale miners. 
As is clear from this research, miners generally do not have a notion of the legal status of their 
activities but focus rather on the fact that they have access to income, and therefore are able to 
provide for their families. 
Interestingly, adhering to the broad notion of formalization, as given by McQuilken 
and Hilson, explained as “the extent to which such laws and regulations are successfully 
activated, implemented, and enforced by the relevant authorities is also central to the 
formalization process” (2016, p. 10), one can argue whether the process of formalization takes 
place at all. Reflecting on the research, as laws and regulations are mostly not properly 
activated, implemented or enforced, it seems clear that the distinction between registered and 
unregistered is inexpedient. What this research shows however, are some characteristics of 
small-scale mining sites that in fact are of great influence on working conditions for small-
scale miners. As such, it would be beneficial for further research not to focus on the legal-
illegal division either but to explore the many other interesting and puzzling aspects to small-
scale mining.  
The presence or absence of large investors on small-scale mining sites is one 
characteristic that causes clear differences on and amongst small-scale mining sites. These 
investors - often originally from China - are willing and able to invest in bigger machinery for 
small-scale miners. The occurrence of increased technological equipment alters the 
characteristics of the site to a great extent, leading to all kinds of interesting power relations 
on the site. Making a division of small-scale mining sites on the basis of this characterization 
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would make for interesting insights into various power relations existing on the mining site. 
These relate amongst others to the distinction between access versus property, as Ghanaians 
have access to become a registered small-scale mining site, whereas (Chinese) investors have 
property, but are not able to gain complete access as they cannot obtain a license). 
Additionally, future research could focus on the contingencies on small-scale mining 
sites such as the breakdown of electricity due to mismanagement of the site, which tends to 
occur very regularly. Miners therefore are mostly concerned with being able to work. 
Interesting to look into, and providing many research angles, are the alternative job 
possibilities there are for small-scale miners. By focusing on the differences between workers 
on registered and unregistered sites, it became clear that miners were mostly contented with 
the work, but by far most miners additionally stated that they would hope to be practicing 
another vocation soon. Generally they expressed that they were now unable to find other jobs, 
but this also has to do with the amount of money they earn. Many miners expressed that they 
themselves or other miners get used to a certain lifestyle and certain income and therefore do 
not even consider other possibilities. This is exemplary of how categorizing the small-scale 
mining sector as poverty-driven is inaccurate and misguided (G.  Hilson & Hilson, 2015).  
Finally, by studying the small-scale mining sector and by differentiating between legal 
and illegal small-scale mining operations, it becomes clear that categorizations and definitions 
are widely applied, however also produced by different actors in different ways. This makes 
these categorizations and definitions susceptible to change and various interpretations. 
Acknowledgement of the production of definitions and categorizations allows for different 
views to be taken into account and nuances to be picked up, such as different views of 
(il)legality and different views of the benefits of formalization policy. As such, viewing the 
small-scale mining sector as pre-defined by legal and illegal actors and operations does not do 
justice to the variations that exist within the small-scale mining sector in Ghana, and would 
overemphasize the importance of the legal status of small-scale mining operations. 
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